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Previous studies have shown that managers are overwhelmingly likely to sacrifice 
long-term firm value for immediate earnings and satisfaction from the financial markets 
(Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal, 2005). Research in marketing has empirically confirmed 
this myopia at both aggregate (Mizik and Jacobson, 2007; Mizik, 2010) and individual 
firm levels (Chapman, 2011). That is, marketing managers consider not only actions that 
impact real earnings, but also how their firm is immediately perceived by the financial 
markets. Although plenty of research exists detailing how managers care about the 
financial markets, how the financial markets react to marketing actions has received less 
attention. That is, how do board members and the general financial markets interpret 
marketing spending and actions?  
This dissertation investigates how firms walk the walk and talk the talk regarding 
marketing spending and communication of strategy. Specifically, I address the following 
questions: (1) How do financial markets interpret real investments in marketing? and (2) 
How are these investments and strategic directions communicated to the financial 
markets? First, I find that markets only appreciate changes in marketing investments 
when those changes directly result in earnings, not when the investments are made. 
Second, I created a novel dataset of communications between firms and markets that 
investigates how marketing constructs are transmitted to the investment community. 
To address these questions, I use a mixture of event and drift studies. This first 





and (b) provides evidence managers can give investors on how firm spending should be 
interpreted. This evidence is consistent with the market initially under-appreciating 
marketing efforts. Specifically, I find differences in the immediate market response to 
earnings announcements for firms expanding versus reducing their marketing and R&D 
effort. The findings suggest that the stock market takes time to fully incorporate 
implications of strategic marketing decisions and tends to update firm valuation when the 
outcomes of marketing strategies are realized in future financial performance and new 
performance signals are sent to the market. 
The second essay is distinctive in that although a large amount of research has 
addressed marketing information released by firms, mine is the first to look at marketing 
information that is released on a periodic basis along with annual announcements. The 
essay also examines the stock market’s reaction to such information. I studied non-
financial disclosures from 1,745 earnings statements for the existence and valence of 
classical marketing constructs, including the 4Ps, 3Cs, consideration of external factors, 
and the amount of space given to management, operations, accounting, and financial 
measures. First, using this unique dataset, I determine which metrics executives are likely 
to be discuss taking into account a firm’s financial situation. Second, using event study 
methodology, I estimate which constructs have a higher ability to move the market and 
increase firm value. Third, by creating long-term portfolios, I determine which statements 
truthfully create long-term value for the firm and which are merely cheap talk meant to 
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1   Introduction 
Ample evidence supports the fact that marketing capabilities create long-term 
firm value (Dutta et al. 1999, Krasnikov and Jayachandran 2008). However, how the 
financial marketplace interprets the value of marketing assets is far less clear. That is, 
although research exists on the release of individual pieces of information in one-time 
events (e.g., product announcements and advertising campaigns), investigations into the 
periodic release of marketing-related information between firms and the financial markets 
has been scant. More specifically, no work has yet explored how financial markets 
interpret this information and how firms might manage this information to better create 
value. 
Managers need to consider how board members, as well as members of the 
financial market, will view marketing investments. This perception drives a manager’s 
ability to set forth on potentially risky new ventures as opposed to focusing on cost-
cutting measures. To address this issue, this dissertation concentrates on two questions: 
(1) How do the financial markets interpret investments in marketing and R&D? and (2) 
How are these investments and strategic directions communicated to the financial 
markets? These questions are managerially relevant because executives need to (a) 
understand how the marketplace will view real strategic investments and (b) effectively 
communicate how other marketing actions will influence real market value.  
The first essay examines changes in marketing and R&D investments and finds 
the financial market only appreciates them when they directly result in earnings, not 
when the investments are made. It (a) highlights the importance of combining long-term 





that managers give investors is digested. The results provide justification for marketing 
and R&D budgets in general and in particular for maintaining them in the face of 
temporary earnings reductions. 
The second essay uses a novel dataset of communications between firms and 
markets to highlight how marketing constructs are transmitted to the investment 
community. By coding 1,745 annual investor statements, I am able to compare the level 
and content of marketing information communicated to investors, look at how this 
information compares to items from other business divisions, and determine the 
likelihood of information being conveyed under different scenarios. Specifically, this 
study content analyzes and empirically examines the non-financial statements by the top 
company executives at the time of annual earnings announcements. 
To address these questions, I use a mixture of event studies, drift studies, and 
other long-term stock market response models. Although a large amount of research 
exists on marketing information released by firms, this paper is the first to look at 
marketing constructs that are released on a regular basis as well as the first to compare 
them to information from other fields. 
Past Research: Marketing and the Financial Markets 
This dissertation contributes to the growing literature in marketing that tackles the 
relationship between marketing actions and the financial markets. This section provides a 
background on research in marketing and other fields that is relevant for this dissertation. 
Analysts follow publicly traded firms by researching their actions and operating 
conditions to predict their future performance. The efficient market hypothesis (EMH) 





expectations of future performance. That is, only deviations from the stock market 
expectations of earnings (i.e., earnings surprises) influence stock price. Firms reporting 
earnings greater than expected typically see an immediate increase in stock price, 
whereas firms that fail to meet their expected earnings benchmark experience an 
immediate decrease in stock price (Collins and Kothari 1989). Under this assumption, 
research in marketing has used the financial markets as a way to assess the change in a 
firm attribute or expenditure such as advertising (Erickson and Jacobson 1992; Ho, Keh, 
and Ong 2005; Hirschey 1982; Joshi and Hanssens 2008), branding (Barth et al. 1998, 
Mizik and Jacobson 2008), new product introductions (Chaney, Devinney, and Winer 
1991; Pauwels et al. 2004), expansion of distribution channels (Geyskens, Gielens, and 
Dekimpe 2002; Gielens et al. 2008), and customer service changes (Nayyar 1995). Most 
of these papers employ some combination of event studies, stock-return response models, 
or long-term stock market methods. Recently, marketing research has also expanded to 
include the impact of customer satisfaction on bond yield (Anderson and Mansi 2009). 
Several recent articles now suggest that the value associated with marketing 
investments may not be realized immediately and that the stock market may undervalue 
investments in marketing assets (e.g., Lehmann 2004, Mizik and Jacobson 2007, Pauwels 
et al. 2004, Rust et al. 2004). This stream of research suggests the stock market might not 
immediately and fully appreciate the contribution of marketing to the firm’s long-term 
financial performance, but it does not explore the underlying mechanism and dynamics of 
this phenomenon (Srinivasan and Hanssens 2009).  
Through recent work in behavioral finance (Shlomo and Thaler 1995), the 





“predictable” long-term behavior in the financial markets was discovered by Ball and 
Brown (1968) who showed that firms exceeding (failing to meet) expected annual 
earnings have stock prices that drift in a positive (negative) direction for the three to six 
months following the announcement. Many studies in finance and accounting have 
replicated this basic result (called post earnings announcement drift, i.e., PEAD), 
recognized as the oldest and most robust financial market anomaly (Fama 1998). The 
immediate stock price adjustment following an earnings announcement occurs because 
stock market participants use new performance information to adjust their expectations of 
the firm’s future performance flows.  
In an apparent contradiction to the efficient market hypothesis, evidence suggests 
positive (negative) earnings surprises induce not only an immediate positive (negative) 
stock price response but also a positive (negative) stock price drift lasting a few months 
following the earnings announcement date. According to EMH, no such drift should exist 
because historical information cannot be used to predict future abnormal returns and to 
create an investment strategy earning excess returns. 
Accounting research explores other factors affecting this anomaly, including firm 
characteristics. These studies report that drift is generally weaker for firms that are larger, 
more liquid, and have lower risk (Bernard and Thomas 1990, Mendenhall 2004, Chordia 
et al. 2007). Mendenhall (2004) finds that firms with higher risk exhibit significantly 
greater levels of drift, although the magnitude of the risk effect is small. In sum, the firm-
specific moderators of drift appear related to the amount of public information available 






The trading costs explanation of drift suggests that a portion of the market 
response to new earnings information is delayed and market participants fail to act on 
new information due to high transaction costs (i.e., the basic assumption of EMH does 
not hold in practice). Specifically the costs of implementing and monitoring a PEAD-
based trading strategy are greater than the potential returns from immediate exploitation 
of new information contained in the earnings announcement. In support of this view, 
Chordia and colleagues (2007) report that the post-earnings-announcement drift occurs 
primarily in highly illiquid stocks. They find that a trading strategy of buying high 
earnings surprise stocks and shorting low earnings surprise stocks provides an average 
value-weighted return of 0.14% per month in the most liquid stocks and 1.6% in the most 
illiquid stocks. However, because illiquid stocks have higher trading costs, transaction 
costs account for 63% to 100% of the paper profits from the PEAD-based trading 
strategy. In other words, traders are not irrational but rather are deterred from exploiting a 
PEAD anomaly by high trading and portfolio management costs.  
Contact with the Financial Markets 
The voluntary disclosure of non-financial information has a long history in the 
accounting and economics literature (Crawford 1992, Verrecchia 1983). Initially, 
Verrechia (1983) discusses how the existence of costs that don’t have to be disclosed 
introduces noise into company valuation and therefore casts doubt on trader valuations. 
Thus, valuation of held information is always biased downward, and the manager would 
be better off disclosing that information immediately, particularly if it is positive. In a 
seminal paper on financial reporting, Grahm, Harvey, and Rajgopal (2005) interviewed 





managers are highly myopic and often satisfy short-term concerns well before long-term 
issues. This finding is consistent with research in management (Chapman 2011) and 
marketing (Mizik and Jacobson 2007, Mizik 2009). Their research also shows that 
managers are focused on reducing risk while setting precedents they can’t maintain. 
Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal write, “Our results indicate that CFOs believe that 
earnings, not cash flows, are the key metric considered by outsiders. The two most 
important earnings benchmarks are quarterly earnings for the same quarter last year and 
the analyst consensus estimate. Meeting or exceeding benchmarks is very important” and 
that “78% of the surveyed executives would give up economic value in exchange for 
smooth earnings.” 
Kothari et al. (2009) summarize one consistent aspect of this disclosure, arguing 
that, in the context of changes in earnings, companies release good news immediately 
while they delay release of downward changes in earnings and then release them in small 
chunks. This behavior is consistent with prospect theory, which claims individuals should 
separate gains and combine losses. Dye’s (1985) theory paper on disclosure discusses 
managers’ reluctance to release non-financial information due to the impact that 
information might have due to a form of risk aversion. From a theoretical perspective, 
Almazan et al. (2008) provide a consistent theory of “cheap talk” between firms and 
capital markets that suggests managers are more encouraged to attract attention when the 
firm is undervalued. That is, firms are similarly less likely to communicate when they are 
overvalued by the marketplace.  
Numerous papers have also documents the impact of information asymmetry 





review of 677 annual reports that firms with better earnings quality have more 
“expansive” disclosures, which is consistent with Almazan et al. (2008). Further, they 
find that these disclosures also lead to a lower cost of capital. Interestingly, they find no 
impact from a “press release” based measure. This area is one of which this dissertation 
looks to investigate further. Miller (2001) also finds an increase in disclosure events 
around positive earnings and a decrease around negative earnings. Zechman (2010) 
demonstrates how cash-strapped firms are more likely to turn to synthetic leases, and 
therefore are less likely to disclose this behavior. Brown, Hillegeist, and Lo (2009) 
investigate information asymmetry in the quarter following earnings surprise and find 
that it is lower (higher) following positive (negative) surprises. In concert, they identify 
decreased information for negative surprises, showing that decreased disclosure masks 
poor earnings and that poor earnings create a lower level of disclosure.  
Skinner (1994) also argues for the existence of an informational asymmetry 
around earnings. He uniquely notes that investors might not want to “hold the stocks of 
firms whose managers are less than candid about potential earnings problems.” This 
motivation is an argument for releasing all information, and might provide rationale for 
Francis, Nanda, and Olsson’s (2008) finding of a decreased cost of capital. 
Finally, Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) contend that the reporting environment in the 
United States already requires such a substantial amount of information that additional 
information carries little value. As such, they compare German firms that switch from 
international reporting standards (1AS) to the more stringent U.S. generally accepted 





bid-ask spreads, and increased trading volume, which are all consistent with increased 
levels of disclosure. 
Essay 1 Summary 
The first essay takes the view that the stock market “gets it,” at least over time. In 
other words, I assume the stock market on average correctly values earnings and 
spending information. The focus in this essay is on whether and how future operating 
results and the stock market react to marketing spending information. I base these 
analyses on the immediate and longer-term reaction to information contained in quarterly 
earnings reports. The results suggest that a combination of earnings and spending 
information can predict future operating results (revenue) and stock prices. Further, 
although the stock market reacts immediately, some time passes before it fully 
incorporates the information contained in earnings reports. The results provide 
justification for marketing and R&D budgets in general and for maintaining them in the 
face of temporary earnings reductions in particular.  
A fair amount of literature exists detailing the value of marketing investments 
from the resource-based-view literature (Srivastava, Shervani, and Fahey 1998). In 
general, these firm resources are considered vital for ensuring company success (Day 
1994). Specifically, Dutta, Narasimhan, and Rajiv (1999) find that marketing and R&D 
capabilities are important determinants of within-industry financial performance. Further, 
they confirm that marketing capabilities are most influential under a strong technological 
base. Ruekert and Walker (1987) also examine how interactions between marketing and 
R&D personnel vary across business units with different strategies. Krasnikov and 





capabilities of marketing, R&D, and operations, and find both marketing and R&D are 
significant, with marketing having more impact. Others argue the capabilities matter 
more than the resources (Grant 1996, Teece 1997). 
Here I examine the financial market’s ability to fully and timely value marketing-
related information in the context of quarterly earnings announcements utilizing high-
frequency (daily) trading data. This context allows us to pinpoint the timing of 
performance and marketing spending information flow. First, I use traditional event study 
methodology to examine the immediate market reaction to earnings announcements 
conditional on firm marketing strategy changes (i.e., increasing or decreasing marketing 
and research and development intensity). Next, I examine the post-announcement stock 
price behavior (i.e., the delayed stock market reaction) of firms undertaking different 
marketing and research and development (R&D) strategy changes. To better understand 
the mechanisms underlying the differential delayed market reaction, I investigate the 
future operating performance of firms changing their marketing and R&D effort and the 
dynamic patterns of the post-earnings-announcement drift (PEAD). 
I find differences in the immediate market response to earnings announcements 
for firms expanding versus reducing their marketing and R&D efforts. Specifically, well-
performing firms (i.e., firms exceeding expected earnings) reporting a simultaneous cut to 
marketing and R&D spending realize lower abnormal returns than firms increasing 
marketing and R&D spending. In addition, firms increasing marketing and cutting R&D 
realize greater abnormal returns than firms cutting marketing and increasing R&D. 
However, evidence also shows a significant PEAD (i.e., a systematic trend in the stock 





of the drift is consistent with the initial under-appreciation of marketing and R&D effort 
and a subsequent correction. That is, firms reporting an increase in marketing and/or 
R&D expenditures have a significantly more positive stock price drift following an 
earnings announcement and significantly outperform firms that decrease both 
expenditures. 
These findings are consistent with the earnings fixation hypothesis (Bernard and 
Thomas 1990, Sloan 1996), which says financial analysts might be paying insufficient 
attention to or not fully appreciating the future performance consequences of non-
earnings information (i.e., marketing and R&D spending changes). I show that firms 
increasing their marketing and R&D spending report significantly greater future 
operating performance than firms decreasing their marketing and R&D spending. An 
examination of the dynamic pattern of stock price adjustment finds that much of the 
future-term adjustment occurs around the time of the subsequent earnings reports. These 
findings suggest that stock market participants wait to observe subsequent earnings 
before fully adjusting their expectations and firm valuation. In other words, the stock 
market does not immediately and fully appreciate the link between marketing-related 
investments and future financial performance (future earnings).  
Essay 2 Summary 
Duncan and Moriarty’s (1993) research on strategic marketing communications 
suggests that managing relationships with customers involves more than advertising and 
that communication is key to managing brand relationships and firm value. The authors 
contend that to effectively manage this relationship, firms have to communicate too many 





media, government regulators, and the community.” As the customer is the core of the 
marketing focus (Rust et al. 2004), the bulk of the academic marketing focus has been on 
communication to potential customers (e.g., Wernerfelt 1996, Goldenberg et al. 2002) 
with only a few papers covering the value of communication in other avenues (e.g. Mohr 
and Nevin 1990, in channel management). One area of communication that research 
should also consider is that between the company and the investment community. 
Smooth earnings and consistent access to capital are desirable financial factors to firms, 
and communication with the markets can influence these. 
Access to low interest rates and consistent stock prices give companies the 
funding to execute long-term R&D developments, invest in quality marketing campaigns, 
and maintain a quality sales force. Importantly, the introduction of new information to the 
marketplace can have noticeable effects on a firm’s stock value, as studies on new 
product introductions (Chaney, Devinney, and Winer,1991) and distribution channels 
(Geyskens, Gielens, and Dekimpe 2002) have shown. 
Although many event studies investigate “one-off” communications of marketing 
actions with the marketplace to assess the value of a certain type of incidence, researchers 
treat such communications as special events. That is, they do not measure the value of the 
“everyday” communication with the world. This paper bridges the gap between out-of-
the-ordinary communications and more common levels of communication between the 
firm and the market: annual reports.  
When public firms announce earnings, in addition to releasing financial figures, 
management has an opportunity to make statements highlighting the company’s future 





Typically, the statements come from the CEO or from another top company executive. 
These statements are usually short, just a few sentences long, do not have a set structure 
or content, and are issued at the discretion of the management. Typically, significant 
effort goes into formulation of these statements: they are carefully crafted and discussed 
by the whole top management team.  
Why do so many firms choose to issue such statements and put so much effort 
into designing them? The success or failure of a firm to meet the analysts’ earnings 
expectations depends on many factors, and CEOs have a wide range of different issues 
they can emphasize in their statements. Non-financial statements are an interesting and 
understudied phenomenon. For example, it is not known which factors are stated by 
executives and how prevalent marketing constructs are considered relative to constructs 
reflecting other operating functions. The effects of these statements are also unclear.  
As such, this essay examines 1,745 earnings statements of non-financial 
disclosures to give insight into this issue. I studied these statements for the existence and 
valence of classical marketing constructs including the 4Ps, 3Cs, other external factors, 
and the amount of space given to management, operations, accounting, and financial 
measures. Using this unique dataset, I first determine which metrics management is likely 
to discuss depending on the financial situation of a firm. Second, using event study 
methodology, I see which constructs have a higher ability to move the market and 
increase firm value. Third, by creating long-term portfolios, I determine which statements 
truthfully create long-term value for the firm and which are merely cheap talk meant to 





I find that by far the largest marketing component management discusses is 
product (26.8%). The second most is place (15.4%), followed well behind by promotion 
(6.5%) and pricing (5.6%). For future items, the order remains the same: product 
(10.1%), place (4.9%), promotion (2.3%), and price (0.7%). Among strategic items for 
executives to discuss is an increase in operating efficiency (21.6%), followed by 
innovation (19.8%), a focus on customers (14.3%), and collaborators (13%). There is 
little mention of a differential focus on competitors (1.7%) or branding (5.7%). Although 
all of these issues are important, the fact that management focuses so little of its time on 
branding is surprising, as the future income of a company—heavily related to branding—
often makes up such a large part of its current valuation. In terms of future items, the only 
frequent mentions are for innovation (8.7%), operating efficiency (6.1%), and customer 
focus (5.2%). This allocation of constructs suggests that companies are more concerned 
about explaining past results than discussing future directions.  
From a marketer’s perspective, a handful of the studied marketing statements 
provided reactions from the financial markets. Notably, executives should bring up 
product development and innovation during positive earnings situations, though bringing 
it up under negative earnings situations only decreases firm value. Similarly, executives 
should highlight product development and innovation as the cause of positive earnings, 
thereby adding more value to their firm. Surprisingly, focusing on the customer has a 
negative impact. Focusing on the future when the firm has done well, however, creates 
value. This result suggests that simply resting on solid returns is not a good idea and that 





more is not better. Nearly all measures of “how much” was written lead to a negative 
return. Investors might see lengthy statements as a cover-up for poor future results.  
Summary 
These essays document new evidence of the dynamic patterns in the stock market 
response to marketing-related information. The substantive findings highlight the need 
for greater study and dissemination of knowledge about marketing’s contribution to the 
financial bottom line and its impact on future financial performance. To the best of my 
knowledge, these studies are the first to employ drift analysis to investigate long-term 
implications of marketing strategies. The findings highlight the importance of assessing 
not only the immediate but also the delayed market response. This dissertation 
contributes to accounting research by identifying a significant new factor (i.e., marketing 
and R&D spending patterns) that affects the long-term stock price phenomenon and by 
adding to the debate on the underlying mechanisms and financial markets efficiency. 
Finally, by creating the dataset used in Essay 2, I hope to initiate more research on the 






2   Essay 1 










Because current earnings predict future financial performance, the stock market reacts 
strongly to earnings announcements. How rapidly and in what manner information about 
marketing actions and strategies is accounted for in the stock valuation is less clear. I 
examine the financial market’s ability to fully and timely value marketing-related 
information released along with quarterly earnings announcements. I find evidence 
consistent with the market initially under-appreciating marketing and R&D effort. 
Specifically, I find differences in the immediate market response to earnings 
announcements for firms expanding versus reducing their marketing and R&D effort. 
However, I also observe a significantly greater positive stock price drift (i.e., systematic 
stock price adjustment) in the months following an earnings announcement for firms 
increasing marketing and/or R&D expenditures. I examine the dynamics and the 
mechanism underlying this differential drift. Firms increasing their marketing and/or 
R&D spending report significantly greater future operating performance than firms 
decreasing their marketing and R&D spending and the stock price adjustment (drift) 
accelerates around the time of the subsequent earnings announcements. Our findings 
suggest that the stock market takes time to fully incorporate implications of strategic 
marketing decisions and tends to update firm valuation when the outcomes of marketing 
strategies are realized in future financial performance and new performance signals are 








Growing evidence demonstrates positive long-term benefits of marketing 
activities such as advertising (Erickson and Jacobson 1992; Ho, Keh and Ong 2005; 
Hirschey 1982; Joshi and Hanssens 2008), branding (Barth et al. 1998, Mizik and 
Jacobson 2008), new product introductions (Chaney, Devinney, and Winer 1991; 
Pauwels et al. 2004), expansion of distribution channels (Geyskens, Gielens, and 
Dekimpe 2002, Gielens et al. 2008), and customer service changes (Nayyar 1995). 
Several recent studies, however, suggest that the value associated with marketing 
investments may take an extended period of time to be realized and that the stock market 
may undervalue investments in marketing assets (e.g., Lehmann 2004, Mizik and 
Jacobson 2007, Pauwels et al. 2004, Rust et al. 2004). This stream of research suggests 
the stock market might not immediately and fully appreciate the contribution of 
marketing to the firm's long-term financial performance but it does not explore the 
underlying mechanism and dynamics of this phenomenon (Srinivasan, Hanssens 2009). 
I examine the financial market’s ability to fully and timely value marketing-
related information in the context of quarterly earnings announcements. I chose the 
earnings announcements setting because it allows us to pinpoint the timing of 
performance and marketing spending information flow. First, I use traditional event study 
methodology to examine the differences in the immediate market reaction to earnings 
announcements conditional on firm marketing strategy changes (i.e., increasing or 
decreasing marketing and research and development intensity). Next, I examine the post-
announcement stock price behavior (i.e., the delayed stock market reaction) of firms 





In order to better understand the mechanisms underlying the differential delayed market 
reaction, I examine the future operating performance of firms changing their marketing 
and R&D effort and the dynamic patterns of the post-earnings-announcement drift 
(PEAD).  
I find differences in the immediate market response to positive earnings surprises 
for firms expanding versus reducing their marketing and R&D efforts. Specifically, firms 
exceeding expected earnings and reporting a simultaneous cut to marketing and R&D 
spending realize lower abnormal returns than firms increasing marketing and R&D 
spending.  In addition, firms increasing marketing and cutting R&D (i.e., shifting to value 
appropriation focus) realize greater abnormal returns than firms cutting marketing and 
increasing R&D (i.e., shifting to value creation focus). I also find evidence of significant 
differences in the delayed market reaction depending on the change in marketing and 
R&D spending patterns. The direction of the drift is consistent with the initial under-
appreciation of marketing and R&D effort and a subsequent correction. Specifically, 
firms reporting an increase in marketing and/or R&D expenditures have a significantly 
more positive stock price drift following an earnings announcement and significantly 
outperform firms that simultaneously decreased both expenditures. 
Our findings are consistent with the earnings fixation hypothesis (Bernard and 
Thomas 1990, Sloan 1996). That is, the market may be paying insufficient attention to or 
not fully appreciating the future performance consequences of non-earnings information 
(i.e., marketing and R&D spending changes). I show that firms increasing their marketing 
and R&D spending report significantly greater future operating performance than firms 





price drift and find that much of the future-term adjustment occurs around the time of the 
subsequent earnings reports. These findings suggest that stock market participants wait to 
observe subsequent earnings before fully adjusting their expectations and firm valuation. 
In other words, the stock market does not immediately fully appreciate the link between 
marketing-related investments and future financial performance.  
This study contributes to the marketing literature by documenting new evidence 
of the dynamic patterns in the stock market response to marketing-related information. 
The substantive findings highlight the need for greater study and dissemination of 
knowledge about marketing’s contribution to the financial bottom line and its impact on 
future financial performance. In addition, to the best of our knowledge, our study is the 
first to employ drift analysis to investigate long-term implications of marketing strategies. 
The findings highlight the importance of assessing not only the immediate but also 
delayed market response. The study also contributes to accounting research by 
identifying a significant new factor (i.e., marketing and R&D spending pattern) that 
affects the PEAD phenomenon and by adding to the debate on the mechanisms 
underlying the PEAD and financial markets efficiency. 
I organize the rest of the paper as follows. I first describe the study setting of 
quarterly earnings announcements and relevant past research. Next, I discuss applicable 
theory and present our hypotheses. The methods section presents the key methodologies I 
use, event study analysis, average drift analysis, and calendar-portfolio analysis, and the 
specific tests for assessing our hypotheses. I then discuss data sources and the study 





Stock Market Reaction to Quarterly Earnings Announcements 
Public firms are required to file quarterly earnings reports with the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC). The process is structured and highly regulated. The stock 
market uses earnings reports as an important source of firm-specific performance 
information. Earnings announcements are also a focal point for managers, whose 
evaluations and compensation are often based on reported performance metrics. 
Immediate Stock Market Reaction 
Analysts follow publicly traded firms by researching their actions and operating 
conditions to predict their future performance. The efficient market hypothesis (EMH) 
postulates that a firm's stock price incorporates all public information and rational 
expectations of future performance. That is, only deviations of actual earnings from the 
stock market equilibrium expectations of earnings (i.e., earnings surprises) influence 
stock price. Firms reporting earnings greater than expected typically see an immediate 
increase in stock price, whereas firms that fail to meet their expected earnings benchmark 
experience an immediate decrease in stock price (Collins and Kothari 1989).  
The immediate stock price adjustment following earnings announcement occurs 
because stock market participants use new performance information to adjust their 
expectations of firm future performance. Due to positive persistence in operating 
performance (i.e., current earnings being positively correlated with future earnings), 
improved (decreased) current earnings signal better (inferior) financial performance in 
the future. The magnitude of the change in the market valuation of a firm following an 
earnings announcement reflects the market’s estimate of the total expected change in the 





quickly incorporates new information in earnings announcements. Patell and Wolfson 
(1984), for example, report that the bulk of the stock price adjustment following an 
earnings announcement occurs in approximately five to fifteen minutes. 
Delayed Stock Market Reaction to Earnings Announcements  
In an apparent contradiction to the efficient market hypothesis, evidence suggests 
that positive (negative) earnings surprises induce not only an immediate positive 
(negative) stock price response but also a positive (negative) stock price drift lasting a 
few months following the earnings announcement date. According to EMH, no such drift 
should exist because historical information cannot be used to predict future abnormal 
returns and to create an investment strategy earning excess returns. 
The PEAD phenomenon was first reported by Ball and Brown (1968). They 
examined annual earnings announcements and observed that firms exceeding (failing to 
meet) expected annual earnings have stock prices that drift in a positive (negative) 
direction for the three to six months following the announcement. Many studies in 
finance and accounting replicated this basic result and the PEAD is recognized as the 
oldest and most robust financial market anomaly (Fama 1998).  
Figure 1a depicts the basic PEAD phenomenon using 127,056 earnings 
announcements conducted between January 1, 1995 and July 1, 2005 and recorded in the 
Thomson IBES database. I sort earnings announcements into two portfolios based on the 
sign of the earnings surprise (i.e., the difference between actual and analysts’ consensus 
estimate of earnings per share) and align data by the date of the earnings announcement. 





compute cumulative buy-and-hold abnormal returns. Portfolio with positive (negative) 
earnings surprises exhibits positive (negative) drift.  
Figure 1: One-Year Post-Earnings-Announcement Drift 
This chart depicts the average post-earnings-announcement drift pattern. The samples are split into two 
groups based on the sign of reported earnings surprise (i.e., exceeding of missing analysts’ earnings 
expectations). I align all data by the date of the earnings announcement (t=0) and track total buy-and-hold 
abnormal returns for 252 trading days (one calendar year) starting from day t=3 for each day for each 
decile.  
 
Figure 1a: All firms covered in the IBES and CRSP databases (number of quarterly earnings 
announcements=127,056) 
 
Past research has shown that the magnitude of PEAD depends on the magnitude 
of the earnings surprise: the greater the surprise, the more extreme the drift. Foster, 
Olsen, and Shevlin (1984), for example, report that a long-short decile portfolio (i.e., 
buying firms in the top decile of positive earnings surprises and short selling those in the 
lowest decile with greatest negative earnings surprises) earns 5.95 percent in abnormal 
returns in the 60 trading days following the earnings announcement. Abarbanell and 
Bernard (1992) find a one-quarter abnormal return of 4.98 percent for a long-short hedge 
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percent abnormal return for a long-short hedge of the top versus bottom deciles over a 
60-day period following earnings announcement.  
Accounting research explores several factors affecting PEAD. One PEAD 
research stream focuses on the role of alternative earnings surprise measures. For 
example, Foster, Olsen, and Shevlin (1984) assess the robustness of the PEAD anomaly 
across different definitions of earnings surprises. They develop autoregressive forecast 
models to predict quarterly earnings and use the forecast residuals as their measure of 
earnings surprise. A number of studies also use financial analysts’ forecasts, rather than 
predictions from time series models, as the measure of expected earnings (Livnat and 
Mendenhall 2006).  
Another set of PEAD studies focuses on firm characteristics affecting the 
magnitude of the drift. These studies report that drift is generally weaker for firms that 
are larger, more liquid, and have lower risk (Bernard and Thomas 1990, Mendenhall 
2004, Chordia et al. 2007). For example, Chordia and colleagues (2007) find that PEAD-
based trading strategy profits decrease with liquidity. Mendenhall (2004) finds that firms 
with higher risk exhibit significantly greater levels of PEAD, although the magnitude of 
the risk effect on drift is very small. In sum, the firm-specific moderators of drift appear 
related to the amount of public information available about a firm: the less publicly 
available information, the greater the magnitude of the post-earnings-announcement drift. 
Considerable research effort in finance and accounting focuses on understanding 
the mechanisms underlying the PEAD phenomenon and discriminating among its 
alternative explanations. The evidence is mixed and the opinions on PEAD differ. Some 





efficient markets, arguing that the market simply fails to fully assimilate available 
information. However, Sloan (1996, p. 314) notes that PEAD returns “do not necessarily 
imply investor irrationality or the existence of unexploited profit opportunities.” The 
literature advances two main explanations, trading costs and risk mismeasurement, for 
the existence of PEAD phenomenon within the efficient markets framework (Kothari et 
al. 2005). 
The trading costs explanation of PEAD suggests that a portion of the market 
response to new earnings information is delayed and market participants fail to act on 
new information due to high transaction costs (i.e., the basic assumption of EMH does 
not hold in practice). That is, the costs of implementing and monitoring a PEAD-based 
trading strategy are greater than the potential returns from immediate exploitation of new 
information contained in the earnings announcement. In support of this view, Chordia 
and colleagues (2007) report that the post-earnings-announcement drift occurs primarily 
in highly illiquid stocks. They find that a trading strategy of buying high earnings 
surprise stocks and shorting low earnings surprise stocks provides an average value-
weighted return of 0.14 percent per month in the most liquid stocks and 1.60 percent in 
the most illiquid stocks. However, because illiquid stocks have higher trading costs, 
transaction costs account for 63 to 100 percent of the paper profits from the PEAD-based 
trading strategy. In other words, traders are not irrational but are rather deterred from 
exploiting a PEAD anomaly by high trading and portfolio management costs.  
The risk mismeasurement explanation suggests that PEAD is an artifact of the 
asset pricing models used to estimate abnormal returns. Specifically, because all capital 





fully adjust for all types of risk. As such, the PEAD abnormal returns may be just fair 
compensation for a risk factor the asset pricing model researchers use does not capture.  
Researchers have also examined the dynamics of the PEAD phenomenon. 
Bernard and Thomas (1989, 1990), for example document that much (though not all) of 
the drift occurs in the first two quarters following the earnings announcement of interest. 
Furthermore, they report average positive abnormal returns of 1.32 and 0.70 percent for a 
long/short of top versus bottom decile portfolios in the short time periods around future 
earnings announcements in the first and second subsequent earnings announcement 
seasons, respectively. These findings suggest the stock market participants do not initially 
appreciate the full future value implications of earnings surprises (i.e., they systematically 
mis-value reported earnings data) but rather wait to adjust their expectations after they 
have had a chance to observe future profitability signals.  
Marketing-Related Information and Earnings Announcements 
At the time of earnings announcements, in addition to basic earnings data, firms 
are also required to release additional information about their operating performance. 
Some of this information pertains to investments in long-term assets and ongoing 
projects: R&D, advertising, and other marketing-related spending are often reported 
along with the earnings information. Past research does not examine the impact of this 
information on the immediate and longer-term market reaction to earnings 
announcements. The main focus of our study is to examine how and how soon the 
financial markets incorporate information about the marketing-related investments 





earnings announcements because it allows us to clearly pinpoint the timing of earnings 
and marketing spending information flow. 
The Role of Marketing and R&D Spending and Market Valuation: 
Hypotheses 
Past research documents positive long-term effects of marketing, innovation, and 
R&D spending (e.g., Dekimpe, Hanssens 1995, 1999; Erickson, Jacobson 1992, Sood, 
Tellis 2009) and examines the long-term performance implications of shifts in strategic 
emphasis on marketing versus R&D (Mizik, Jacobson 2003). Managers expand, contract, 
and rebalance their focus, effort, and spending to pursue strategic goals and to respond to 
changing environmental conditions.  
However, managers may undertake some resource reallocations not only in a 
legitimate pursuit of a long-term market strategy but rather to satisfy immediate 
performance goals. Because managers are aware of the earnings-return relationship and 
their jobs and compensation often depend on the stock market valuation of their firm, 
they may try to influence market valuation by sending distorted performance signals to 
the market. An artificial inflation of earnings, if undetected by the market, may 
temporarily increase firm valuation. One way to inflate earnings is to cut immediate 
costs, for example, marketing and R&D spending. Because for many marketing strategies 
(e.g., new product development, brand building, customer service improvements, and 
retention programs) the realization of successful marketing investments in cash flows 





funding reserves for managing current earnings. In other words, they may engage in 
myopic management.1  
It is unclear when the market recognizes spending cuts as a tool for earnings 
inflation and how it incorporates information about the changes in spending reported 
concurrently with earnings announcements. Whether the market recognizes differential 
performance implications of shifting strategic emphasis between marketing 
(appropriation focus) and R&D (value creation focus) immediately or with a delay is also 
unclear. Based on this discussion, I propose the following hypotheses.    
Immediate Market Reaction 
If the market appreciates the long-term consequences of marketing and R&D 
spending, the market will respond more positively (less negatively) to firms reporting 
positive (negative) earnings surprises alongside an increase in marketing and R&D 
spending versus firms reporting a simultaneous cut to marketing and R&D spending.  
Hypothesis 1a: The stock market's immediate response to firms reporting positive 
(negative) earnings surprise accompanied by an increase in marketing and R&D 
spending will be more positive (less negative) than for firms reporting a simultaneous 
decrease in marketing and R&D spending. 
 
In addition, because spending cuts at the time of increased earnings (i.e., positive 
earnings surprises) may be used for earnings inflation, firms cutting their marketing and 
R&D spending will realize a greater negative performance differential compared to other 
firms when the earnings surprise is positive rather than negative:  
Hypothesis 1b: The return differential will be greater for firms reporting a 
positive rather than a negative earnings surprise.   
 
                                                 
1 Bushe (1998) and Roychowdhury (2006) show that firms tend to cut R&D spending to reverse earnings 
decline. Mizik and Jacobson (2007) find that firms tend to cut marketing spending to inflate earnings to 





Past research examines performance implications of shifts between value creation 
(innovation and R&D) and value appropriation (marketing) in the firm’s marketing 
strategy in the context of stock return response modeling using annual data (Mizik and 
Jacobson 2003). This research reports that, under general conditions, a greater emphasis 
on value appropriation leads to better future performance and that the positive effect of 
emphasis on marketing is further amplified when companies increase their marketing 
focus at the time of improved financial performance. Therefore, for firms with mixed 
investment strategies:  
Hypothesis 2a: The immediate stock market response to firms reporting an 
increase in marketing and a decrease in  R&D spending will be more positive 
than to firms reporting a decrease in marketing and an increase in R&D 
spending. 
Hypothesis 2b: The return differential will be greater for firms reporting positive 
rather than negative earnings surprises. 
 
Post-Earnings-Announcement Drift 
Whether the market is able to immediately and fully appreciate investments in 
marketing and R&D is unclear. That is, if the market does not immediately recognize 
their full performance implications, changes in marketing and R&D spending might 
attenuate basic PEAD pattern in the direction consistent with their future performance 
impact. Therefore:   
Hypothesis 3a: The post-earnings-announcement drift for firms reporting 
earnings, accompanied by an increase in marketing and R&D spending, will be 
more positive than for firms reporting a simultaneous decrease in marketing and 
R&D spending. 
Hypothesis 3b: The PEAD return differential will be greater for firms reporting a 
positive rather than a negative earnings surprise.  
  
 If the market does not immediately and fully appreciate the differential impact of 





R&D) but does so after their implication have been reflected in future performance, I 
might also observe a differential drift for firms shifting their strategic focus. However, it 
is difficult to predict a priori whether the market is better able to anticipate long-term 
performance outcomes of R&D or long-term performance outcomes of marketing 
investments. Both activities are associated with high outcome uncertainty. While I do not 
know whether the market tends to under- or overreact to the news of firms shifting their 
strategic focus, some research has suggested that the market might systematically under-
react to information concerning firm strategy (e.g., Daniel and Titman 2006). If the 
market simply fails to see full benefits of marketing emphasis or discounts its returns at a 
higher rate than R&D returns, the market’s initial reaction will not correctly reflect full 
performance implications of shifting resources between marketing and R&D. As a result, 
I might observe a future-term adjustment in valuation and this adjustment (drift) will be 
more positive for firms shifting their strategic focus to value appropriation (i.e., 
increasing marketing and decreasing R&D spending) versus value creation (i.e., 
decreasing marketing and increasing R&D spending). As such, I hypothesize the 
following:  
Hypothesis 4: The post-earnings-announcement drift for firms reporting an 
increase in marketing and a decrease in R&D spending will be more positive than 
for firms reporting a decrease in marketing and an increase in R&D spending. 
 
Future Operating Performance  
Past research suggests that the market’s inability to correctly anticipate future 
operating performance may drive PEAD.  Similarly, the differential drift induced by 
changes in marketing and R&D spending may also be related to the market’s inability to 





marketing resource allocation strategies. I examine the pattern of future operating 
performance and hypothesize that it would parallel the pattern of observed drift. That is, 
first, I postulate that increases in marketing and R&D investments lead more positive 
changes in the future operating performance: 
Hypothesis 5a: The future operating performance of firms reporting an increase 
in marketing and R&D spending will be more positive than future operating 
performance of firms reporting a simultaneous decrease in marketing and R&D 
spending.   
 
 With respect to future operating performance stemming from mixed strategies, if 
managers efficiently rebalance their focus to respond to market threats and opportunities, 
in the long-run, I would expect equivalent performance. However, in the short-run, I 
might see significant differences in operating performance of firms shifting their strategic 
focus. Past research generally suggests that R&D investments tend to take longer to 
germinate positive results, whereas most marketing spending produces faster returns. 
Therefore: 
Hypothesis 5b: The future operating performance of firms reporting an increase 
in marketing and a decrease in R&D spending will be more positive than the 
future operating performance of firms reporting a decrease in marketing and an 
increase in R&D spending in the short term. In the long term, no significant 
performance differences will exist between mixed strategies.  
 
The Dynamics of the Post-Earnings-Announcement Drift  
Hypothesis 5a suggests increases (decreases) in marketing and R&D spending are 
associated with the future-term improvement (deterioration) in firm operating 
performance. If stock market participants do not fully appreciate this relationship or do 
not fully update their expectations of firm future performance until increased (decreased) 
future earnings have been realized, the bulk of the PEAD adjustment will occur at the 





misvaluation versus the risk mismeasurement explanations of potential mispricing, 
Kimbrough and McAlister (2009) suggest examining whether future stock returns are 
clustered around subsequent information events. That is, if the market fails to fully 
appreciate the benefits of marketing and R&D spending when it occurs, I will observe 
acceleration in the market valuation adjustment during the subsequent earnings 
announcement seasons and the market will be more positively surprised at the time of the 
future earnings announcements by firms that increased their marketing and/or R&D 
intensity: 
Hypothesis 6: The drift accelerates around the time of the future-period earnings 
announcement seasons and the pace of the valuation adjustment is greater for 
firms increasing marketing and/or R&D spending.  
 
Methodology 
Testing Hypotheses 1 and 2: Event Study  
To test the immediate change in firm valuation following an earnings 
announcement, I undertake an event study for firms grouped by the sign of earnings 
surprise and changes in marketing and R&D spending. I divide each (i.e., positive and 
negative) earnings surprise condition into four groups: Group 1 firms have a decrease in 
both marketing and R&D expenditures (ΔMktg-/ΔR&D-); Group 2 firms decrease 
marketing expenditures but increase R&D spending (ΔMktg-/ΔR&D+); Group 3 firms 
increase marketing expenditures but decrease R&D (ΔMktg+/ΔR&D-); and Group 4 
firms increase both marketing and R&D expenditures (ΔMktg+/ΔR&D+).  A differential 
market reaction across groups 1 through 4 would constitute evidence that, conditional on 
the sign of earnings surprise, the market expects different future long-term performance 





To test Hypotheses 1 and 2, I use standard event study methodology as outlined 
by MacKinlay (1997) and Srinivasan and Bharadwaj (2004). Event studies have long 
been used to study the immediate market reaction to marketing actions such as firm name 
changes (Horsky and Swyngedouw 1987), new product preannouncements and 
introductions (Elisashberg and Robertson 1988, Chaney, Devinney, and Winer 1991), 
product recalls (Mitchell 1989), celebrity endorsements (Agrawal and Kamakura 1995), 
brand extensions (Lane and Jacobson 1995), and strategic market entry (Gielens, Van de 
Gucht, Steenkamp, and Dekimpe 2008).  
Our events of interest are quarterly earnings announcements. I compute expected 
and abnormal stock returns for event window and assess differences in cumulative 
abnormal stock returns across the groups. Exhibit 1 presents a schematic representation 
of our study timeline. 
Exhibit 1: Study Timeline 
 
 
I compute abnormal stock return (AR) for firm i, day t as 
ARit = Retit – E[Retit], where (1)
Retit is the raw return for firm i on day t and E[Retit] is the expected return. I use the 





(Carhart 1997) to compute expected returns. Specifically, I use a pre-event period 
beginning twelve months (252 trading days) before and ending one month (21 trading 
days) before the earnings announcement date and estimate the following model for each 
firm i and each quarterly earnings announcement q:   
Retit-RiskFreet = αqi + βmkt,qi(RetMktt–RiskFreet) + βSMB,qiSMBt + βHML,qtHMLt + 
βUMD,qtUMDt + εit, 
(2)
where RiskFreet is the risk-free rate, RetMktt is the market return, SMBt is the difference 
in returns beween small and large firms, HML is the difference in returns between high 
and low value firms, and UMD is the Charhart (1997) momentum factor. I use the 
estimates of market ( ˆ mkt,qi), SMB ( ˆ SMB,qi), HML ( ˆ HML,qt), and UMD ( ˆ UMD,qi) risk 
factor loadings to compute abnormal returns for each day t, firm i, and earnings 
announcement q as follows:  
ARit = Retit – [RiskFreet + ˆ mkt,qi(RetMktt–RiskFreet) + ˆ SMB,qiSMBt + ˆ HML,qtHMLt 
+ ˆ UMD,qtUMDt]. 
(3)
I compute cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for each firm i and event window 









 and use the Corrado (1989) non-parametric event study 
rank test to assess the significance of abnormal returns. 2 I present results for the [-1; 2] 
event window.3 That is, our event study window begins a day before the earnings 
                                                 








































 and Kit is the rank of the 
abnormal return of security i at the event time period t, and N is the number of securities in the group. 
3 We have examined some alternative event windows and found results in close correspondence to those we 





announcement date (to accommodate any potential information leakage) and ends two 
days after the announcement. 
Testing Hypotheses 3 and 4: Post-Earnings-Announcement Drift 
I use two methodologies to test Hypotheses 3 and 4: a firm-level analysis to assess 
the differences in average drift across our groupings and a calendar-time portfolio 
analysis. First, I examine the patterns of abnormal returns following earnings 
announcements and test for differences in average buy-and-hold abnormal returns across 
our groups. The drift study period begins three days after the earnings announcement and 
continues for 252 trading days (12 calendar months). I do not include the first two days 
following the announcement in order to exclude the effects of the immediate market 
reaction. I compute buy-and-hold abnormal portfolio returns (BHAR) as follows: 4  












 , where 
(4)
Retit and E[Retit] are defined as previously.  
 If the market does not fully appreciate the differential performance implications 
of changing spending patterns (i.e., the initial reaction is incomplete), I will observe 
differences in the average BHARs consistent with Hypotheses 3 and 4. Under the null 
hypotheses, no differences in drift will exist across our groups. 
 I also undertake standard calendar-time portfolio analysis tests. Following 
Sorescu, Shankar, and Kushwaha (2007), I create portfolios of securities, “purchasing” 
stocks three days after the firms announce earnings and allocating them to one of our 
portfolios depending on earnings surprise and changes in marketing and R&D spending. 
Each batch of added stock is held for 180 calendar days (six months) after purchase. As 
                                                 
4 We have undertaken sensitivity tests using some alternative measures of long-term abnormal return (e.g., 





in Sorescu, Shankar, and Kushwaha (2007), each portfolio is equally weighted within 
period and then value weighted by the number of firms in a given time period. Thus, for 
each day of our study period, I have a single return measure for each portfolio. I assess 
the presence of abnormal returns in each portfolio by estimating the four-factor model 
with momentum (Carhart 1997) and testing for the significance of αp:  
Retpt-RiskFreet = αp + βmkt,p(RetMktt–RiskFreet) + βSMB,pSMBt + βHML,pHMLt + 
βUMD,pUMDt+ εpt. 
(5)
Under Hypothesis 3a, I expect the intercept for group 4 to be greater than for 
group 1 (α4 > α1) and, under Hypothesis 3b, the difference between these intercepts to be 
greater for firms reporting positive rather than negative earnings surprises. Under 
Hypothesis 4, I expect the intercept for group 3 to be greater than the intercept for group 
2  (α3 > α2).  Under the null hypotheses of no differential drift, the intercepts will not be 
significantly different across any of our portfolios. 
Testing Hypotheses 5: Future Operating Performance 
To assess differences in the future operating performance across groups, I 
examine changes in sales (a top-line performance metric) and net income (a bottom-line 
performance metric) in the four quarters following the initial earnings announcement. For 
each of the future four quarters following the earnings announcement, I compute a size-
adjusted change in operating performance as ΔPerformanceq= (Performanceq - 
Performance0)/Assets0, with the earnings announcement occurring in quarter q=0. 
Findings of better future operating performance for firms reporting an increase in 
marketing and R&D spending than for firms reporting a simultaneous decrease in 





operating performance in the short term for firms reporting an increase in marketing and 
a decrease in R&D spending compared to firms with a decrease in marketing and an 
increase R&D spending would support Hypothesis 5b.  
Testing Hypothesis 6: The Dynamics of PEAD  
To test Hypothesis 6, I examine the dynamic patterns of returns for our portfolios 
over one year following the initial earnings announcement. Each year a firm makes four 
quarterly earnings announcements. I have a total of eight periods: four earnings 
announcement seasons alternating with four no-earnings announcement periods. I 
compute portfolio buy-and-hold abnormal returns for each of our groups and test whether 
the rate of adjustment in firm valuation (i.e., the slope of the drift trend) differs during the 
future earnings announcement seasons as compared to the rate of adjustment in the 
periods outside of the earnings announcement season. I estimate the following model for 
each portfolio separately:    
pttt
season






where t is the time index, noEarningsSeasont is an indicator variable equal to 1 during the 
no-earnings season and 0 during the earnings announcement period, EarningsSeasont is 
an indicator variable equal to 1 during the earnings announcement period and 0 
otherwise, and season  is an intercept for each season. Under Hypothesis 6, I expect | 1 | > 
| 0 | and 1 for groups 2, 3, and 4 greater than 1  for group 1.  
Data 
I use three sources to compile our dataset. Financial analysts’ estimates of 





earnings announcement are drawn from the Thompson Financial I/B/E/S database for the 
period beginning January 1, 1995 through July 1, 2005. I obtain daily stock return data 
from the CRSP database starting one year before and ending one year after the 
announcement. I use return data before the announcement to estimate our asset pricing 
model (2).5 For the drift study, I use the returns in the year following the announcement. 
Merging the databases creates a sample of 8,013 unique securities and 127,056 quarterly 
earnings announcements.6 Figure 1a depicts the PEAD for this sample of 127,056 
quarterly earnings announcements for two portfolios: firms reporting a positive and firms 
reporting a negative earnings surprise.  
I obtain quarterly R&D spending and other necessary accounting data for the 
period covering January 1, 1995 through July 1, 2005 from the Compustat database. 
Many firms in the 127,056 announcements sample do not have R&D data available. The 
R&D data are typically missing in Compustat when the data are not available or when 
R&D spending constitutes less than 5 percent of the operating budget. Restricting our 
study sample to firms reporting their R&D and having all other data (e.g., sales, earnings) 
necessary to undertake our tests available reduces the sample to 3,090 unique firms and 
31,348 quarterly earnings announcements. I use this sample to test our hypotheses. Table 
1 presents descriptive statistics for the sample. This sample represents a wide cross-
section of firms that differ widely in size, profitability, and R&D intensity. Firms in our 
sample typically dedicate at least 5 percent of their spending to R&D.    
                                                 
5 To allow for the estimation of model 2, we require the firm stock to trade consecutively for six months 
before the earnings announcement.  
6 Approximately 52% of our sample firms were delisted from CRSP during the study period due to 
mergers, bankruptcy, or switching indices, of these, 3.3 % do not have a delisting return reported. Because 






Table 1: Sample Statistics (N=31,348) 
This table presents descriptive statistics for all NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ firms that issued earnings 
announcements between 1/1/1995 and 6/30/2005, had at least one analyst estimating quarterly earnings, as 
reported in the I/B/E/S database, and had information for selling, general, and administrative expenses and 
R&D expenses available in Compustat.  




Prct. Data Source Data Items 
Net income ($MM) 27.16 1.37 -10.88 1.93 54.70 Compustat data8 
Sales  ($MM) 430.22 9.21 7.91 48.84 739.98 Compustat data2 
Assets ($MM) 2033.20 41.53 40.86 243.46 3551.50 Compustat data44 
Market cap ($MM) 4599.57 116.60 62.90 444.72 6736.81 CRSP shares, price 








Actual earnings per 
share ($) -0.03 0.04 -0.20 0.10 0.43 IBES actual EPS 
SG&A intensity 0.0952 0.0004 0.0315 0.0803 0.1735 Compustat data1, data44 
R&D intensity 0.0286 0.0002 0.0053 0.0228 0.0556 Compustat data4, data44 
Marketing intensity 0.0666 0.0003 0.0189 0.0554 0.1281 Compustat data1, data4, data44 
 
Figure 1b depicts the PEAD pattern in our study sample. The greater magnitude 
of PEAD for firms reporting positive earnings surprise and a lower but still positive drift 
for firms reporting negative earnings surprise is consistent with prior findings reporting 
an overall market under-reaction to R&D (Chan, Lakonishok, and Sougiannis 2001; 
Chambers, Jennings, and Thompson 2002; Eberhart, Maxwell, and Siddique 2004). That 
is, the initial under-reaction to R&D explains the general positive adjustment trend in our 
data sample: the positive adjustment (drift) for R&D-intensive firms dominates the 
negative PEAD associated with the negative earnings surprise and exaggerates the 





pattern differences in the R&D-intensive sample are interesting,7 they play no role in tests 
of our hypotheses as our focus is on establishing relative differences in drift  across our 
groups with different changes in R&D and marketing spending patterns.     
Figure 1b: All firms covered in IBES and CRSP databases that are also reporting SGA and R&D 
spending in Compustat (number of quarterly earnings announcements=31,348) 
 
Variable Definitions  
Earnings Surprise: I compute earnings surprise as the difference between the actual and 
the analysts’ mean consensus forecast of expected earnings. 
Change in R&D spending: I compute the change in quarterly R&D spending intensity as 
the difference between current and same-quarter of the prior year R&D intensity (i.e., 
R&Diq/Assetsiq-R&Diq-4/Assetsiq-4). Using the four-quarter change, rather than last-
quarter change, allows us to remove potential seasonality.  
Change in marketing spending: Following past research (Dutta et al. 1999, Mizik and 
Jacobson 2007), I use the difference between selling, general, and administrative (SGA) 
                                                 
7 We were not able to identify research examining PEAD differences depending on R&D intensity or other 











0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200 220 240
Trading Days





and R&D spending as a proxy for marketing spending. While capturing some additional 
non-marketing items, this measure is the best data available to ascertain quarterly 
marketing spending. I compute the change in the marketing intensity as the difference 
between current and same-quarter of the prior year marketing intensity ((SGAiq-
R&Diq)/Assetsiq)-(SGAiq-4-R&Diq-4)/ Assetsiq-4)).8  
Group membership: Based on changes in marketing and R&D intensity, I classify each 
quarterly earnings announcement event into one of the following four groups:  
Group 1 has a simultaneous decrease in marketing and R&D spending (ΔMktiq≤0, 
ΔR&Diq≤0); 
Group 2 has a decrease in marketing and an increase in R&D spending (ΔMktiq≤ 0, 
ΔR&Diq>0); 
Group 3 has an increase in marketing and a decrease in R&D spending (ΔMktiq>0, 
ΔR&Diq≤0); 
Group 4 has a simultaneous increase in marketing and R&D spending (ΔMktiq>0, 
ΔR&Diq>0). 
Earnings and No-Earnings Season Indicators: I use two dummy variables to identify 
future earnings and non-earnings seasons. I align all our earnings announcements by the 
date of the initial announcement and track the abnormal returns relative to the initial 
announcement date. Future earnings announcements occur approximately every three 
months and can be expected at 63, 126, 189, and 252 trading days following the initial 
announcement, but some variation exists in terms of exact timing of future earnings 
                                                 
8 We have also used alternative proxies for a measure of change in marketing and R&D intensity. For 
example, we formed forecasts and used the unanticipated change in marketing and R&D as a measure of 
change in spending. We found results in close correspondence to those we report and these results are 
available from the authors upon requests. We chose to present our findings based on simple change rather 





releases. Some firms might announce next-quarter earnings a bit sooner or later than 63 
trading days following the prior announcement. To accommodate for this variation, I 
allow for a wide definition of future earnings season. I define EarningsSeasoniqt variable 
as equal to 1 in the 15 trading days before and 15 trading days after an expected future 
earnings announcement date and zero otherwise. Thus, each earnings announcement 
season covers a 31-day “earnings season” period centered around days 63, 126, 189, and 
252 past the initial earnings announcement. I define noEarningsSeasoniqt as equal to zero 
during our designated earnings season and 1 otherwise.  
Results 
Event Study  
Table 2 reports the results of the event study tests. Firms exceeding (failing to 
meet) analysts’ expectations realize positive (negative) four-day cumulative abnormal 
returns of 2.36 percent, 2.21 percent, 3.08 percent, and 2.84 percent (-2.56 %, -2.55 %, -
2.34 %, and -2.51 %) for groups 1, 2, 3, and 4, respectively. I observe some notable and 
significant differences in CARs across the four groups reporting positive earnings 
surprises. Specifically, consistent with Hypothesis 1a, firms cutting marketing and R&D 
spending realize significantly lower abnormal returns compared to firms increasing their 
marketing and R&D spending. The difference in CAR between Group 4 and Group 1 for 
firms reporting positive earnings surprises (.48 percent) is significantly different from 
zero (p=.02). However, the difference between groups 4 and 1 for firms reporting 
negative earnings surprises is small (.05 percent), not significant, and not significantly 





support for Hypothesis 1a only for positive earnings surprise condition and I find no 
support for Hypothesis 1b. 
Table 2: Immediate Market Reaction to Reported Earnings for Firms Changing 
Their Marketing and R&D Spending Patterns: [-1, 2] Event Window  
This table presents abnormal returns for a 4-day event window surrounding quarterly earnings 
announcements for firms reporting positive and negative earnings surprises and falling into one of four 
groups: 
Group 1 has a simultaneous decrease in marketing and R&D spending (ΔMktit ≤ 0, ΔR&Dit ≤ 0); 
Group 2 has a decrease in marketing and an increase in R&D spending (ΔMktit ≤ 0, ΔR&Dit > 0); 
Group 3 has an increase in marketing and a decrease in R&D spending (ΔMktit > 0, ΔR&Dit ≤ 0); 
Group 4 has a simultaneous increase in marketing and R&D spending (ΔMktit > 0, ΔR&Dit > 0). 
 Group 1   Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 Group comparison test p-
value 




1 vs. 4 1 vs. 2,3,4 2 vs. 
3 
Well-performing firms (i.e., firms reporting a positive earnings surprise): 
CAR 2.36 2.21 3.08 2.84 .02 .05 <.01 
Standard Error (.152) (.209) (.222) (.166)    
Corrado Statistic  [21.64] [16.65] [26.06] [22.32]    
p-value <.01 <.01 <.01 <.01    
N 6,078 3,034 2,950 5,221    
        
Underperforming firms (i.e., firms reporting a negative earnings surprise):
CAR -2.56 -2.55 -2.34 -2.51 .69 .69 .51 
Standard Error (.177) (.218) (.232) (.186)    
Corrado Statistic  [-14.37] [-18.84] [-20.92] [-19.21]    
p-value <.01 <.01 <.01 <.01    






I find strong support for Hypothesis 2a for firms with positive earnings surprises. 
That is, cumulative abnormal returns for well-performing firms (i.e., firms reporting 
positive earnings surprises) with increased marketing spending and decreased R&D 
spending are significantly greater than for firms cutting marketing and increasing R&D. 
The differential between groups 3 and 2 is .87 percent and is highly significant. However, 
I find no significant differences between groups 2 and 3 for under-performing firms (i.e., 
firms reporting negative earnings surprises), and the difference in differences between 
groups 2 and 3 for firms with positive versus negative earnings surprises, although 
directionally consistent with Hypothesis 2b, is not significant (p=.15).  
Post-Announcement Stock Price Adjustment: Drift Studies 
Figures 2a and 2b depict the average PEAD for our four groups for firms 
reporting positive and negative earnings surprises, respectively. I align all the data by the 
earnings announcement date at day t=0, group firms based on earnings surprise and 
spending pattern, and track the average buy-and-hold abnormal return for each grouping 
starting from day t=3. Table 3 reports results of formal statistical tests of Hypotheses 3 
and 4. I report the magnitude and the statistical significance of three-months (63 trading 







Table 3: Post-Earnings-Announcement Drift 
Table 3 Panel A reports the average buy-and-hold abnormal returns, and Table 3 Panel B reports estimates 
of daily abnormal returns in the calendar portfolio for firms reporting positive and negative earnings 
surprises and falling into one of the four following groups:  
Group 1 has a simultaneous decrease in marketing and R&D spending (ΔMktit ≤ 0, ΔR&Dit ≤ 0); 
Group 2 has a decrease in marketing and an increase in R&D spending (ΔMktit ≤ 0, ΔR&Dit > 0); 
Group 3 has an increase in marketing and a decrease in R&D spending (ΔMktit > 0, ΔR&Dit ≤ 0); 
Group 4 has a simultaneous increase in marketing and R&D spending (ΔMktit > 0, ΔR&Dit > 0). 
Table 3 Panel A: Average Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns   
The stock is “purchased” 3 days after the earnings announcement and held for 63 and 252 trading days (12 
month). 
 Group 1   Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 Group comparison test p-
value 









Well-performing firms (i.e., firms reporting a positive earnings surprise):
BHAR (%) 0.38 1.79 3.01 3.02 <.01 <.01 .12 
Standard Error (.394) (.522) (.567) (.477)    
T-Statistic [0.96] [3.43] [5.31] [6.33]    
N 6,078 3,034 2,950 5,221    
Underperforming firms (i.e., firms reporting a negative earnings surprise):
BHAR (%) -0.26 0.90 0.52 0.34 .32 .15 .66 
Standard Error (.452) (.611) (.637) (.508)    
T-Statistic [-0.58] [1.47] [0.82] [0.67]    
N 4,399 2,697 2,379 4,621    
12-month-
averageBHAR        
Well-performing firms (i.e., firms reporting a positive earnings surprise):  
BHAR (%) -3.03 7.78 7.79 9.56 <.01 <.01 .98 
Standard Error (0.98) (1.77) (1.71) (1.45)    
T-Statistic [-3.09] [4.40] [4.56] [6.59]    
N 6,078 3,034 2,950 5,221    
Underperforming firms (i.e., firms reporting a negative earnings surprise):  
BHAR (%) 1.71 5.37 4.05 4.90 .07 .05 .57 
Standard Error (1.28) (1.81) (1.81) (1.46)    
T-Statistic [1.34] [2.97] [2.24] [3.36]    







Table 3 Panel B: Calendar-Time Portfolio Value-Weighted Abnormal Daily Returns  
The stock is added to the portfolio 3 days after the earnings announcement and held for 180 calendar days. 
I estimate the following model for each portfolio return: 
Retpt-RiskFreet = αp + βmkt,p(RetMktt–RiskFreet) + βSMB,pSMBt + βHML,pHMLt + εpt, 










1 vs. 4 1 vs. 2,3,4 2 vs. 3 
Well-performing firms (i.e., firms reporting a positive earnings surprise):
αp 0.029 0.048 0.058 0.064 .03 .04 .53
Standard Error (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011)    
T-Statistic 2.54 4.02 5.42 5.98    
N 2,785 2,786 2,776 2,773    
Underperforming firms (i.e., firms reporting a negative earnings surprise):
αp 0.040 0.046 0.039 0.057 .24 .45 .70
Standard Error (0.010) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)    
T-Statistic 4.08 3.96 3.39 4.99    






Three months following the earnings announcement, I observe significant positive 
average drifts of 1.79 percent, 3.01 percent, and 3.02 percent for firms in groups 2, 3, and 
4, respectively. In contrast, the drift for group 1 (i.e., ΔMkt-, ΔRD-) is small (.38 percent) 
and not significantly different from zero. The difference between groups 4 and 1 (2.64 
percent) is consistent with the prediction of Hypothesis 3a and is highly significant 
(p<.01). I observe no significant drift and no significant differences across the groups of 
firms reporting negative earnings surprises. The difference in differences between groups 
4 and 1 across the positive versus negative earnings surprise conditions, however, is 
significant (p=.02) and consistent with Hypothesis 3b.  
Twelve months following the earnings announcement, the magnitude of drift is 
clearly increased and some of the differences across groups become more pronounced. 
For firms reporting positive earnings surprises, I observe significant positive average 
buy-and-hold abnormal returns of 7.78 percent, 7.79 percent, and 9.56 percent for groups 
2, 3, and 4, respectively, and a significant negative average BHAR of -3.03 percent for 
group 1. For firms reporting negative earnings surprises, the drift is 1.71 percent, 5.37 
percent, 4.05 percent, and 4.90 percent for groups 1, 2, 3, and 4, respectively, and is 
insignificant only for group 1. The differences in group 4 versus group 1 performance are 
significantly greater when firms report positive rather than negative earnings surprises 
(p<.01). As such, I find full support for Hypothesis 3a and 3b with the 12-months horizon 
tests.  
I do not find support for Hypothesis 4 at either three or twelve months following 
earnings announcement. Although for well-performing firms at three months post 





these differences are not significant (p=.12) and dissipate completely at twelve months 
following earnings announcement. In other words, I find no systematic relative 
misvaluation of marketing versus R&D effort.  
Table 3 Panel B reports tests of Hypothesis 3 and 4 using calendar-portfolio 
methodology. The pattern of results is similar to that reported in Panel A. I observe 
significantly better portfolio performance for firms reporting positive earnings surprises 
and increasing (.064) rather than cutting (.029) their marketing and R&D spending. 
Although the results are directionally consistent with the hypotheses for firms reporting 
negative earnings surprises, I see no significant differences in portfolio performance. I 
also find no significant difference in differences across well- and poorly performing firm 
portfolios 4 and 1 (p=.43). Further, consistent with the findings reported in Panel A, I 
find no significant support for Hypothesis 4; mixed strategies (portfolios 2 and 3) 






Figure 2: Post-Earnings-Announcement Drift Conditional on Changes in Marketing 
and R&D Spending Patterns 
These charts depict the post-earnings-announcement drift for our study sample conditional on the changes 
in their marketing and R&D spending. I align all data by the date of the earnings announcement (t=0) and 
track total buy-and-hold abnormal returns for 252 trading days (one calendar year) starting from day t=3 for 
each day. 
Figure 2a: Firms that exceed their expected earnings (number of observations = 17,266) 
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Future Operating Performance  
Changes in the average operating performance for each group appear in Table 4. 
Panel A presents change in revenue (i.e., total sales) as a percentage of assets for each of 
the subsequent four quarters following the earnings announcement. The overall pattern 
parallels the patterns of PEAD for our groups. I see significantly greater growth in 
revenue for firms increasing rather than cutting their marketing and R&D spending. For 
example, at four quarters out, I see a 7.26 versus 3.32 percent and a 3.57 versus 2.74 
percent average revenue increase for groups 4 and 1 with positive versus negative 
earnings surprises, respectively. The difference in group 4 versus group 1 performance is 
significantly greater (p<.01) for firms reporting positive earnings surprises. As such, I 
have full support for Hypothesis 5a for the top-line performance metric (revenues).  
Interestingly, I also observe some significant differences in revenue changes for 
groups 2 and 3. For firms reporting positive earnings surprises, consistent with 
Hypothesis 5b, I observe significantly greater growth in sales for firms increasing 
marketing and cutting R&D in quarters two and three. After one year, however, these 
differences even out and the growth in revenue is similar (3.73 percent for group 2 and 
3.76 percent for group 3). For under-performing firms (i.e., firms reporting negative 
earnings surprises), however, I see no significant differences between groups 2 and 3 in 
the first three quarters following the initial period. However, by the fourth quarter, group 
3 realizes significantly greater revenue growth. Thus, I have support for Hypothesis 5b 






Table 4 Panel B reports changes in net income as a percentage of firm assets. For 
well-performing firms, I observe a pattern consistent with the results Panel A depicts for 
revenue growth and with Hypothesis 5a. Firms reporting positive earnings surprises and 
increasing their marketing and R&D spending report a significant average increase in net 
income of .93 percent, whereas firms cutting spending report a significant average 
decrease of -1.23 percent in net income four quarters later. For underperforming firms in 
group 4, the average net income increase is 2.47 percent and is highly significant, 
whereas the net income decrease for group 1 firms is -.20 percent and is not statistically 
significant. Thus, consistent with Hypothesis 5a, I observe significant differences in net 
income changes for firms in groups 4 and 1, but these differences do not differ 
significantly across overperforming and underperforming firms (p=.28).  
Further, for well-performing firms, I find some evidence in quarters one and three 
that firms increasing R&D rather than marketing tend to have greater growth in net 
income (.59 vs. -.09 and .41 vs. .01, respectively). But I observe no significant systematic 
differences between groups 2 and 3 one year after the initial earnings announcement. For 
firms reporting negative earnings surprises, net income growth is consistently 
significantly greater for firms increasing R&D rather than marketing spending. Four 
quarters after the initial earnings announcement when the groupings were formed, firms 
in group 2 report an average 1.16 percent increase whereas group 3 firms report an 
average increase of only .33 percent in net income. As such, I do not find support for 
Hypothesis 5b for the net income measure in the four quarters I examine. Contrary to 





and cut marketing realize greater improvement in profitability, particularly for firms 






Table 4: Operating Performance 
These tables present changes in firm operating performance as a percentage of assets in the four quarters 
following the initial earnings announcement by group. 
Group 1 has a simultaneous decrease in marketing and R&D spending (ΔMktit ≤ 0, ΔR&Dit ≤ 0); 
Group 2 has a decrease in marketing and an increase in R&D spending (ΔMktit ≤ 0, ΔR&Dit > 0); 
Group 3 has an increase in marketing and a decrease in R&D spending (ΔMktit > 0, ΔR&Dit ≤ 0); 
Group 4 has a simultaneous increase in marketing and R&D spending (ΔMktit > 0, ΔR&Dit > 0). 
Table 4 Panel A: Change in Sales 
 Group 1   Group 2  Group 3  Group 4  Group comparison test p-
value 




1 vs. 4 1 vs. 
2,3,4 
2 vs. 3 
Well-performing firms (i.e., firms reporting a positive earnings surprise): 
Quarter 1 0.91 0.70 0.93 1.57 <.01 .07 .15 
 (0.08) (0.10) (0.13) (0.17)    
 [11.38] [7.00] [7.15] [9.24]    
 5,916 2,956 2,876 5,186    
Quarter 2 1.78 1.64 2.38 2.96 <.01 <.01 <.01 
 (0.11) (0.14) (0.23) (0.20)    
 [16.18] [11.71] [10.35] [14.80]    
 5,724 2,863 2,773 5,014    
Quarter 3 2.46 2.61 3.26 5.16 <.01 <.01 .03 
 (0.12) (0.18) (0.23) (0.27)    
 [20.50] [14.50] [14.17] [19.11]    
 5,543 2,750 2,701 4,810    
Quarter 4 3.32 3.73 3.76 7.26 <.01 <.01 .93 
 (0.13) (0.20) (0.20) (0.36)    
 [25.54] [18.65] [18.80] [20.17]    
 5,375 2,661 2,589 4,620    
        
Underperforming firms (i.e., firms reporting a negative earnings surprise): 
Quarter 1 0.63 0.71 0.65 0.57 .58 .98 .73 
 (0.08) (0.10) (0.12) (0.08)    
 [7.88] [7.10] [5.42] [7.13]    
 4,245 2,595 2,238 4,416    
Quarter 2 1.40 1.38 1.34 1.85 .02 .22 .85 
 (0.11) (0.15) (0.16) (0.15)    
 [12.73] [9.20] [8.38] [12.33]    
 4,041 2,493 2,119 4,162    
Quarter 3 2.15 2.21 2.28 2.66 .03 .12 .77 
 (0.13) (0.17) (0.19) (0.18)    
 [16.54] [13.00] [12.00] [14.78]    
 3,894 2,394 2,010 3,974    
Quarter 4 2.74 2.56 3.10 3.57 .01 .03 .05 
 (0.14) (0.19) (0.20) (0.21)    
 [19.57] [13.47] [15.50] [17.00]    






Table 4 Panel B: Change in Net Income  
 Group 1   Group 2  Group 3  Group 4  Group comparison test p-
value 




1 vs. 4 1 vs. 
2,3,4 
2 vs. 3 
Well-performing firms (i.e., firms reporting a positive earnings surprise): 
Quarter 1 -0.48 0.59 -0.09 0.76 <.01 <.01 <.01 
 (0.08) (0.13) (0.13) (0.16)    
 [6.00] [4.54] [0.69] [4.75]    
 5,916 2,957 2,874 5,184    
Quarter 2 -0.64 0.41 0.14 0.96 <.01 <.01 .17 
 (0.10) (0.15) (0.13) (0.18)    
 [6.40] [2.73] [1.08] [5.33]    
 5,723 2,864 2,774 5,012    
Quarter 3 -1.11 0.41 0.01 1.17 <.01 <.01 .05 
 (0.21) (0.16) (0.12) (0.20)    
 [5.29] [2.56] [0.08] [5.85]    
 5,542 2,750 2,700 4,808    
Quarter 4 -1.23 0.06 0.25 0.93 <.01 <.01 .47 
 (0.25) (0.20) (0.17) (0.22)    
 [4.92] [0.30] [1.47] [4.23]    
 5,374 2,661 2,587 4,616    
        
Underperforming firms (i.e., firms reporting a negative earnings surprise): 
Quarter 1 -0.68 0.63 -0.07 1.49 <.01 <.01 .01 
 (0.13) (0.22) (0.17) (0.24)   
 [5.23] [2.86] [0.41] [6.21]    
 4,245 2,595 2,238 4,413    
Quarter 2 -0.35 0.97 -0.01 1.85 <.01 <.01 <.01 
 (0.15) (0.23) (0.15) (0.25)    
 [2.33] [4.22] [0.07] [7.40]    
 4,039 2,494 2,117 4,159    
Quarter 3 -0.27 0.95 0.12 2.27 <.01 <.01 .01 
 (0.15) (0.25) (0.19) (0.26)    
 [1.80] [3.80] [0.63] [8.73]    
 3,896 2,394 2,007 3,970    
Quarter 4 -0.20 1.16 0.33 2.47 <.01 <.01 <.01 
 (0.16) (0.23) (0.17) (0.26)    
 [1.25] [5.04] [1.94] [9.50]    








Dynamics of Drift  
The shaded areas in Figures 2a and 2b highlight our designated future earnings 
season periods. I note the acceleration in drift during future earnings seasons and 
undertake formal tests to assess whether the slope of the trend in drift is steeper during 
the future earnings seasons. Table 5 Equation 1 columns report estimates of the overall 
trend for each of the groups. The results further confirm our prior findings and tests of 
Hypotheses 3 and 4. Consistent with the findings reported in Table 3, the greatest overall 
trend is for firms reporting increases rather than simultaneous cuts to marketing and R&D 
spending. 
Table 5 Equation 2 columns report trend conditional on earnings season or no-
earnings season for each of our groups. For all groups, I find a significant improvement 
in fit when the trend is allowed to differ across earnings and no-earnings announcement 
seasons. A more interesting finding is the acceleration of the PEAD during the 
subsequent earnings seasons. For each group, with the exception of well-performing 
firms in group 1, the slope of the trend is positive and significantly greater in magnitude 
during the future earnings seasons as compared to the trend in no-earnings seasons. 
Further, for well-performing firms, the magnitude of the trend during future earnings 
announcement seasons is significantly greater (p<.01) in groups 2 (.051), 3 (.074), and 4 
(.061) as compared to the .020 trend in group 1. These findings suggest that the market 
receives more unexpected positive news for firms in groups 2, 3, and 4 at the time of the 
future earnings announcements. I also find that, for the underperforming firms, the drift at 
the time of the future earnings announcements is significantly greater (p=.04) for group 4 





Table 5: The Dynamics of PEAD around Future Earnings Announcements 
 
This table presents the test of the differential rate of adjustment in firm valuation during future earnings 
announcement seasons as compared to the rate of adjustment in the periods outside of future earnings 
announcement season. Equation 1 estimates the overall trend for a particular group. Equation 2 allows the 
slope of the trend to differ depending on earnings announcement season. 
 










where t is the time index, noEearnSeasont is an indicator variable equal to 1 during the no-earnings season 
and 0 during the earnings announcement season, and EarnSeasont is an indicator variable equal to 1 during 
the earnings announcement season and 0 otherwise.  
Group 1 has a simultaneous decrease in marketing and R&D spending (ΔMktit ≤ 0, ΔR&Dit ≤ 0); 
Group 2 has a decrease in marketing and an increase in R&D spending (ΔMktit ≤ 0, ΔR&Dit > 0); 
Group 3 has an increase in marketing and a decrease in R&D spending (ΔMktit > 0, ΔR&Dit ≤ 0); 
Group 4 has a simultaneous increase in marketing and R&D spending (ΔMktit > 0, ΔR&Dit > 0). 
 Group 1   Group 2  Group 3  Group 4  
 ΔMktit≤0,  ΔR&Dit≤0 
ΔMktit≤0,  ΔR&Dit>0 
ΔMktit>0,  ΔR&Dit≤0 
ΔMktit>0,  ΔR&Dit>0 
 Eq. 1 Eq. 2 Eq. 1 Eq. 2 Eq. 1 Eq. 2 Eq. 1 Eq. 2 
Well-performing firms (i.e., firms reporting a positive earnings surprise): 
trendoverall _  -0.0152      [-29.30]  
0.0299      
[124.46]  
0.0324      
[40.22]  
0.0401      
[156.35]  
 
         
0   -0.0096     [-11.85]  0.0287      [80.01]  0.0396      [42.14]  0.0417      [99.42] 
         
1   0.0259      [5.03]  0.0512      [22.36]  0.0740      [12.32]  0.06142    [22.93] 
         
MSE 0.0289 .0054 0.1125 0.0413 0.1320 0.0815 0.2020 0.0867 
Adjusted R2 .78 .93 .98 .99 .87 .99 .99 .99 
Underperforming firms (i.e., firms reporting a negative earnings surprise): 
trendoverall _  0.0017       [3.90]  0.0176      [35.19]  0.0206      [44.26]  0.0235      [61.63]  
         
0   0.0034      [4.54]  0.0161      [22.70]  0.0179      [32.64]  0.0201      [35.67] 
         
1   0.0376    [7.94]  0.0377      [8.31]  0.0414      [11.81]  0.0496      [13.77] 
         
MSE 0.0004 0.0009 0.0390 0.0154 0.0535 0.0151 0.0696 0.02178 








 Several sensitivity analyses further validate our findings and rule out some 
alternative explanations. For example, I replicated all tests using the classic Fama and 
French three-factor model (1992, 1993) and found that the inclusion or exclusion of the 
momentum factor does not affect our results. I estimated unanticipated changes in 
marketing and R&D and used our estimates of unanticipated changes to classify firms 
into four groups. Use of unanticipated rather than actual changes produced results similar 
to those I report, and did not alter any of our conclusions. I also examined alternative 
event windows and found results in close correspondence to those I report. I tested 
alternative abnormal return metrics to compute cumulative abnormal returns (e.g., CAR, 
Fama 1998) and found that our findings are stable across different definitions of 
cumulative abnormal return measures. I have re-estimated all our panel data models using 
cluster robust standard error estimation to address the effects of potential cross-sectional 
dependency. The use of cluster robust standard errors does not not significantly affected 
our findings. I examined potential differences in firm-specific characteristics across our 
groupings (e.g., the magnitude of earnings surprise, firm size, liquidity, etc.) past research 
identified as factors affecting the magnitude of PEAD and found that any differences 
cannot explain our findings of differential immediate market response and differential 
drift. These additional analyses add validity to our interpretation of the findings: 
differences in marketing and R&D spending are associated with differential immediate 







Our findings indicate that although the financial markets recognize differential 
performance implications of changing marketing and R&D spending patterns and appear 
to appreciate the possibility that managers might be inflating current earnings through 
simultaneous cuts to marketing and R&D at the time they receive this information, the 
initial market reaction is incomplete. That is, the market does not immediately 
incorporate full implications of these strategies into the valuation of the firm. Although I 
observe differential immediate market response to firms expanding versus shrinking their 
marketing and R&D intensity, I also document significant differences in future-term 
valuation adjustments. The differences I observe are consistent with the market initially 
undervaluing the contribution of marketing and R&D spending to the future operating 
performance of the firm. Over time, once the stock market observes future operating 
performance outcomes, the valuation of the firm is adjusted. In other words, the stock 
market participants take time to fully impound the implications of marketing and R&D 
activities into firm valuation.  
Interestingly, although I see significant differences in the market reaction and 
future-term adjustment for firms simultaneously cutting versus expanding their marketing 
and/or R&D effort, I find no differential future-term adjustments for firms using mixed 
strategies. This finding suggests that no systematic stock market mispricing is associated 
with shifting of resources between marketing and R&D activities.  
Importantly, the future-term operating performance of firms differs following 





increases in intangible investments lead real shifts in future income and sales. Further, the 
future-term valuation adjustment (i.e., drift) is generally consistent with the differential 
pattern of future operating performance changes across our groups. Firms simultaneously 
increasing their marketing and R&D spending report the greatest growth in revenues and 
net income and the greatest stock price drift, whereas firms cutting their spending report 
the lowest growth and the lowest drift. 
Finally, the adjustment in firm valuation accelerates significantly around the time 
of the future earnings announcements. This finding suggests the market receives 
relatively more positive “surprising” performance information for firms that increase 
their marketing and/or R&D spending.  
Implications 
This study establishes several key results and generates implications for 
marketing managers and academics. First, the results demonstrate that, in the short term, 
investors may not fully understand the benefits (i.e., future term-performance 
implications) of investments in intangible assets. Specifically, some degree of earnings 
fixation and some under-appreciation of intangibles investment strategy appear to exist. 
Indeed, our findings of differential drift for firms cutting rather than increasing their 
marketing and/or R&D can not be explained by differences in trading cost across our 
groups (our sensitivity analyses uncovered no significant differences in firm 
characteristics that would support this alternative explanation). Further, the second 
alternative explanation (i.e., risk mis-measurement) is also unlikely to explain our results 





drift is related to changes in spending pattern, and I find that the drift accelerates around 
the time of subsequent earnings announcements (Kimbrough and McAlister 2009). 
Interestingly, our findings also show that the initial misvaluation is corrected over 
time. That is, although there might be a short-term earnings fixation, in the long-run, the 
consequences of a strategy will be reflected in operating performance and managers who 
increase intangible investments will eventually see greater profitability and higher stock 
market valuation of their firm.   
The findings also provide credence to the value of increasing investments in 
intangible assets. I observe greater improvement in future revenue and net income for 
both well-performing and underperforming firms increasing rather than cutting their 
marketing and R&D spending. This finding supplements past research showing positive 
average returns for investments in intangible assets (Dekimpe and Hanssens 1995, 1999; 
Aaker and Jacobson 1994).  
Finally, the study's evidence strongly suggests that short-term stock market 
reactions should be interpreted with caution. Even when the market has complete 
information, it may not always fully and immediately value the implications of marketing 
strategies. This finding suggests that all event studies examining marketing phenomena or 
strategies need to be supplemented with drift studies examining potential long-term 
adjustment following the event. I were able to identify only one marketing study that 
undertook drift analysis in conjunction with an event study to ensure the initial market 
reaction captured the full consequences of a marketing event (Gielens, Van de Gucht, 





Directions for Further Research 
Several interesting directions exist for future research. I focus on examining the 
timing and the mechanism of how the stock market incorporates information about 
marketing and R&D investments into firm valuation. An exploration/reexamination of 
the magnitude and timing of market reaction to other marketing-related phenomena (e.g., 
brand extensions, company name changes, major branding initiatives, etc.) would be 
interesting. Another possible avenue of research would be an examination of potential 
differences in the communication strategies the firms use (e.g., cheap talk) to 
explain/justify changes in marketing and R&D spending. Further examination of the 
dynamics of the longer-term changes in the various operating performance measures 
might also be worthwhile. Finally, risk considerations have recently become an important 
research topic in marketing. Researchers might be interested in exploring not only the 
changes in future operating performance, which I explore in this study, but also 
examining possible changes in riskiness of the firm as a result of changes in its marketing 
and R&D strategies. 
Conclusion 
The inability of the financial markets to fully and immediately incorporate future-
term performance implications of different intangibles investment strategies allows some 
managers to engage in myopic management of marketing and R&D effort. Although 
firms often release information about changes in their intangible investments along with 
earnings announcements, it may take several months for the implications of the change in 
a firm’s investments to be fully reflected in its valuation. Specifically, firms that cut 





of the announcement. Rather, their firm’s valuation slowly adjusts over an extended 
period. Moreover, the operating performance reported at the future earnings 
announcements is what appears to trigger/accelerate valuation adjustments. This research 
adds support to the notion that investors appear to fixate on current earnings and tend to 









3   Essay 2:  
Communicating with the Financial Markets: 








In this study, I investigate the likelihood and impact of how firms communicate 
marketing information to investors. This question is highly relevant for marketers, as how 
this information is released can have a significant impact on the perception and value of 
the firm. Often press releases from firms have a large amount of “cheap talk” meant to 
either mitigate the negative impact of problems or highlight the success of the company. 
However, which releases succeed and which are true is unclear. Thus I examine 1,745 
earnings statements of non-financial disclosures to give insight into this issue. I studied 
these statements for the existence and valence of classical marketing constructs including 
the 4Ps, 3Cs, other external factors, and the amount of space given to management, 
operations, accounting, and financial measures. Using this unique dataset, I first 
determine which metrics management teams are likely to discuss depending on the 
financial situation of a firm. Second, using event study methodology, I identify which 
constructs have a higher ability to move the market and increase firm value. Third, by 
creating long-term portfolios, I can estimate whether these statements truthfully create 
long-term value for the firm or whether they are merely cheap talk meant to moderate 
market response. Finally, I elaborate on methods that are more effective for mitigating 






Duncan and Moriarty’s (1998) research on strategic marketing communications 
asserts that managing relationships with customers involves more than advertising and 
that communication is also key to managing brand relationships and firm value. The 
authors argue that to effectively manage this relationship, firms have to communicate 
along many fronts besides customers, including “employees, suppliers, channel members, 
the media, government regulators, and the community.” As the customer is the core of 
the marketing focus (Rust et al. 2004), the bulk of the academic spotlight has been on 
communication to potential customers (e.g., Wernerfelt 1996, Goldenberg et al. 2002) 
with only small number of papers covering the value of communication in other avenues 
(e.g., Mohr and Nevin [1990] in channel management). One area that can also be 
considered is the importance of communication between the company and the investment 
community. Smooth earnings and consistent access to capital are desirable financial 
factors to firms which communication with the financial markets can influence. 
Consistent stock prices and access to low interest rates give companies the 
funding to execute long-term R&D plans, invest in marketing campaigns, and maintain a 
sales force. Furthermore, the introduction of new information to the marketplace can have 
important effects on a firm’s stock value, as studies on new product introductions 
(Chaney, Devinney, and Winer 1991) and distribution channels (Geyskens, Gielens, and 
Dekimpe 2002) illustrate. 
Although many event studies investigate “one-off” communications of marketing 
actions with the marketplace to see the value of a certain type of incidence, researchers 





the “everyday” communication with the world. As such, this paper seeks to bridge the 
gap between these out-of-the-ordinary communications and more common levels of 
communication between the firm and the market: annual reports. 
When public firms announce earnings, in addition to releasing financial figures, 
management has an opportunity to make statements highlighting the company’s future 
strategic plans and/or to better frame or provide explanations of reported results. 
Typically, the statements come from the CEO or another top company executive. These 
statements are usually short, just a few sentences long, do not have a set structure or 
content, and are issued at the discretion of the management. Typically, significant effort 
goes into formulation of these statements: the entire top management team carefully 
crafts and discusses them.  
Why do so many firms choose to issue such statements and put so much effort 
into the design? The success and failure of the firm to meet the analysts’ earnings 
expectations depends on many factors and CEOs have a wide range of different issues 
they can emphasize in their statements. Such non-financial statements are an interesting 
and understudied phenomenon. For example, it is not known which factors are stated by 
executives and how prevalent marketing constructs are considered relative to constructs 
reflecting other operating functions. The effects of these statements are also unclear. 
The prevalence of these statements and the organizational attention and effort 
awarded to designing them, however, lead us to believe top management views these 
non-financial disclosures as a means of communicating with the financial markets to help 





communication might be a valuable strategic tool firms use to manage the expectations 
about their future performance.  
Indeed, several authors have noted the inherent trade-off management faces 
between meeting earnings targets and investing in long-term intangible assets (Mizik and 
Jacobson 2007). Building strong marketing assets and capabilities (brands, loyal 
customer base, etc.) requires significant investments that might be recouped only in the 
future. Non-financial disclosures provide an opportunity for the management team to 
emphasize performance elements the current accounting statements do not reflect. That 
is, the management can highlight increased spending on brand building or socially 
responsible business initiatives as indicators of future profits and the source of current 
increased costs and lower profitability. 
I explore the content and the effects of executives’ statements on the stock market 
response to earnings announcements. Are these statements valuable or are they just 
“cheap talk” with no value implications? Specifically, I assess the content patterns of the 
CEO non-financial statements at the time firms announce quarterly earnings and the 
financial market’s reaction to such statements. I use content analysis in conjunction with 
event study and calendar-time portfolio analysis to address the following questions:  
 What is the prevalence of different information items contained in executive 
statements at the time of earnings announcements?   
 How prominent are marketing-related constructs and metrics in the executive 
statements? 





 Does the specificity of the statement have a moderating effect on the magnitude 
of the market response? 
 Do differential effects exist across different performance conditions? 
To my best knowledge, this essay is the first attempt to content-analyze and empirically 
examine the non-financial statements by top company executives at the time of earnings 
announcements. The accounting literature has explored this area at a basic level, and I am 
bringing it to the marketing field to continue the dialogue between marketing, accounting, 
and the stock market. Further, bridging the gap between marketing and accountability has 
been a focus of the Marketing Science Institute multiple times, and most recently from 
2008–10. I investigate what firms discuss, how much focus they award to marketing 
metrics, and whether these statements help moderate market response to quarterly 
earnings announcements. 
Research on Non-Financial Disclosure 
The accounting literature has studied the phenomenon of non-financial disclosure. 
However, accounting research has mainly focused on the amount rather than the content 
of such disclosures and has not explored marketing-related content. In the marketing 
literature, several event studies have explored the effects of non-financial 
disclosures/announcements (e.g., new product announcements, company name changes, 
celebrity endorsements) on firm value. These studies focus on a single specific type of 
disclosure. Some studies have examined the content of annual reports, such as Yadav, 
Prabhu, and Chandy (2007), who analyze the level of CEO attention toward innovation in 
the banking industry. This study differentiates itself by examining a host of marketing 





Communications Management in Marketing 
In the marketing context, communication often focuses on how to better target 
and position to the consumer. For example, a literature similar to Narayanan et al. (2005) 
develops structural models to show how marketing communication has a lagged 
“reduction of uncertainty” effect on product adoption while the direct “more is better” 
dominates. Work by Manchanda et al. (2008) models how communication and 
interpersonal relationships are leaders in product adoption. Other work by Libai et al. 
(2009) shows how interpersonal communications can impact brand choice. 
More classical studies in marketing focus directly on the comprehension of 
advertising. For example, Jacoby, Hoyer, and Sheluga (1980) find that viewers 
miscomprehend up to one third of television ads. Further, Belch (1982) finds that 
repetition of the message does not impact purchase intentions. A print media follow-up 
by Jacoby and Hoyer (1989) finds readers miscomprehend 21.4% of print and that 
editorial content performed even worse. Thus, although a comprehension issue is clearly 
associated with writings such as those in earnings reports, readers find them easy to gloss 
over or miss. This paper points out the value of print items by financial analysts, 
regardless of the percentage readers might comprehend.  
Communication Management in Accounting 
The voluntary disclosure of non-financial information has a long history in the 
accounting and economics literature (Crawford 1992, Verrecchia 1983). Verrechia (1983) 
discusses how the existence of costs a company does not have to disclose introduces 
noise into company valuation. Thus valuation of held information is always biased 





particularly if it is positive. In a seminal paper on financial reporting, Graham, Harvey, 
and Rajgopal (2005) interview executives to find what factors drive disclosure decisions. 
They find that managers are highly myopic and often satisfy short-term concerns well 
before long-term issues. This finding is consistent with research in management 
(Chapman 2011) and marketing (Mizik and Jacobson 2007, Mizik 2009). They also find 
that managers are focused on reducing risk while setting precedents they can maintain. 
Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal write, “Our results indicate that CFOs believe that 
earnings, not cash flows, are the key metric considered by outsiders. The two most 
important earnings benchmarks are quarterly earnings for the same quarter last year and 
the analyst consensus estimate. Meeting or exceeding benchmarks is very important” and 
that “78% of the surveyed executives would give up economic value in exchange for 
smooth earnings.” 
Kothari et al. (2009) summarize one consistent aspect of this disclosure which 
argues that, in the context of changes in earnings, good news gets released right away, 
whereas downward changes in earnings are delayed to investors and then released in 
small chunks. This behavior is consistent with prospect theory, which claims individuals 
should separate gains and combine losses. Dye’s (1985) theory paper on disclosure 
discusses managers’ reluctance to release non-financial information due to the impact 
that information might have due to investors’ aversion to risk. From a theoretical 
perspective, Almazan et al. (2008) provides a consistent model of “cheap talk” between 
firms and capital markets that suggests managers are more encouraged to attract attention 
when the marketplace undervalues their firms and are less likely to communicate when 





Numerous papers have also documented the impact of information asymmetry 
between firms and markets. For example, Francis, Nanda, and Olsson (2008) find, from a 
review of 677 annual reports, that firms with better earnings quality have more 
“expansive” disclosures, which is consistent with Almazan et al. (2008). Further, they 
find that these disclosures also lead to a lower cost of capital. Interestingly, they find no 
impact from a “press release” based measure. This dissertation looks to investigate this 
area further among others. Miller (2001) also finds an increase in disclosure events 
around positive earnings and a decrease around negative earnings. Zechman (2010) 
demonstrates how cash-strapped firms are more likely to turn to synthetic leases and in 
turn less likely to disclose this behavior. Brown, Hillegeist, and Lo (2009) investigate 
information asymmetry in the quarter following earnings surprise and find it is lower 
(higher) following positive (negative) surprises. In concert, they identify decreased 
information for negative surprises, showing that decreased disclosure masks poor 
earnings and poor earnings create a lower level of disclosure.  
Skinner (1994) also pushes the concept of informational asymmetry around 
earnings. Uniquely, he notes that investors may not want to “hold the stocks of firms 
whose managers are less than candid about potential earnings problems.” This assertion 
is an argument for releasing all information, and might provide a rationale for Francis, 
Nanda, and Olsson (2008) finding of a decreased cost of capital for more informative 
firms. 
Finally, Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) argue that the reporting environment in the 
United States already requires such a substantial amount of information that additional 





from international reporting standards (1AS) to the more stringent U.S. generally 
accepted accounting principles (GAAP). They find that these firms have decreased cost 
of capital and bid-ask spreads, and increased trading volume, which are all consistent 
with increased levels of disclosure. 
Earnings Management Research  
Related to the concept of discretionary disclosure is the earnings management that 
comes with it. Rountree, Weston, and Allayannis (2008) show that the market prefers 
smooth earnings. As such, managers should smooth earnings, and experimental evidence 
supports this assertion. For example, McVay, Nagar, and Tang (2006) find that managers 
are more likely to manage earnings during stock sales. That is, as firm executives must 
notify the SEC before they sell stock, a window of time exists between the notification 
and actual sale during which earnings manipulation is more likely. More recently, Cohen, 
Mashruwala, and Zach (2010) find that managers often manipulate advertising spending 
in the last quarter of a fiscal period to hit targets. Specifically, they find managers in 
mature markets often increase advertising to hit sales targets, although, in general, 
managers decrease advertising spending to avoid losses. The decreased advertising 
spending behavior is consistent with Chapman (2011), who uses scanner data to find that 
supermarkets often slash pricing near the end of fiscal periods to hit targets. That is, they 
decrease prices instead of increasing advertising. Both studies also find negative effects 
in the following periods. 
Central Questions 
As mentioned in a number of initiatives by MSI (as well as Nath and Mahajan 





marketing. This focus might be related to hiring, advertising, developing connections, 
service quality, and a number of other factors. This decreased focus may manifest itself to 
observers in many ways, as demonstrated by a decreased level of firm awareness among 
customers, weaker brand image, poorer targeting, and suboptimal pricing. One way this 
decreased focus might also manifest is through reporting. That is, when firms need to 
change their focus, the marketplace might observe this change via annual reports.  
Using this unique dataset, I first determine which metrics management is likely to 
discuss depending on the financial situation of a firm. That is, the initial goal of this 
dataset is to discern the level of marketing constructs these annual reports bring up. 
Although the research has addressed disclosures of financial and accounting information, 
no studies have investigated the level and content of marketing characteristics.  
I also determine the extent to which expected earnings and other factors will have 
an impact on the type of content the reports contain. That is, are firms that have missed 
earnings more likely to discuss product changes, or are firms that beat earnings more 
likely to highlight the success of marketing campaigns? As the literature on voluntary 
disclosure shows throughout, companies commonly “spin” earnings and situations to 
better their situations and to smooth earnings. Although firms have different incentives 
for what firm actions they choose to announce (or even pre-announce) firm actions 
(Calantone and Schatzel 2000), this is a unique opportunity to see an everyday situation. 
The second phase of this essay centers on the impact the discussion of both 
marketing and non-marketing related factors has on the stock market response. 
Specifically, I use event studies to see which constructs have a higher ability to move the 





talking about a particular item on the list, the average market reaction for a particular 
item gives insight into the value of that statement. In addition, I investigate how the 
financial situation of the firm will impact the influence of what is said. Viewing firms in 
different financial states can capture this impact. 
Third, by creating long-term portfolios, I determine which statements truthfully 
create long-term value for the firm and which are merely cheap talk meant to moderate 
market response. This addition is important, as it allows for the determination of which 
items might be “cheap talk” designed to satisfy the marketplace and which items will, in 
fact, be successful and lead to positive earnings in future periods. In the context of social 
responsibility, Wagner, Lutz, and Weitz (2010) demonstrate that firms often act in 
opposition to their stated beliefs. This essay will be a test of this hypothesis for common 
communication. That is, do firms do what they say? 
Data Creation and Methods 
I merged data from three different sources to compile the research data file. I 
collected data from the text of actual earnings announcements (which contain both 
financial data and non-financial CEO statements) from the Nasdaq Earnings Call 
database. After examining the CEO statements, I determined that a software-based data 
coding was inappropriate. Interpretation of the meaning of the statements requires 
understanding marketing concepts and interpretive evaluation of the statements. I was not 
able to identify a software package that would produce reasonable results for my 
purposes.  
As such, I undertook an initial content analysis of the qualitative CEO statements 





were (1) to validate the coding tool I developed for this project and adjust it (e.g., edit and 
expand categories) if necessary and (2) to create a working data file for preliminary 
analyses. The coding effort was successful in achieving the first goal. Appendix A 
presents the updated coding scheme resulting from this initial coding effort.  
The main challenge with this project was the cost of undertaking high-quality 
content analysis of the existing data. The other data sources I relied on are standard and 
are available to most researchers. I obtained the stock return data from the daily CRSP 
database. I obtained the Fama and French (market, size, and book-to-market) risk factors 
needed to model abnormal returns from the WRDS database. Analysts’ earnings forecasts 
and actual earnings are from the IBES.  
Statement Coding 
I constructed the primary research dataset from earnings reports from January 1, 
2007, through March 15, 2007. In this period, I collected 3,484 earnings reports from 
Thomson Financial Services. Within this group, I limited my sample to only annual 
earnings reports for firms that had a calendar year end December 31, 2006. That is, I did 
not consider quarterly reports. I also removed firms that appeared to be financial- or 
insurance-related firms as they have a unique structure of earnings releases and because 
they often have a different earnings structure. I did so by removing all firms with an SIC 
code from 60-69, as well as firms known to be heavily financial in nature. I also removed 
all internationally based firms, which file as ADRs. This process gives a dataset of 1,841 
firms, 19 of which I removed because I could not determine an SIC code for them. These 
8-K reports can be found on the SEC website. They are not the annual reports, which 





company’s position. Some are as short as one page and range up to 100 or more 
depending on the amount of financials and level of description included. 
Four students executed the coding of the reports. Before the coding process 
began, the students spent six weeks learning the terminology and meaning in financial 
statements, as well as practice coding the determined elements (defined in Appendix A). 
Following the training period, two readers coded each report independently. For any 
discrepancies, the coders came to a mutual determination of the correct value. 
Coding Manual 
I constructed the coding manual to efficiently organize the items I considered 
important and provide a centralized resource to the coders. Overall, I divided the coding 
manual into three categories: (I) firm actions that the firm can control, (II) forces and 
conditions outside of its control, and (III) general information. For example, an increased 
focus on corporate alliances within the firm would fall under category I, whereas 
financial troubles of a supplier would fall under category II. For sections I and II, these 
items can pertain to both current and future events, so I made designations for both. 
This section provides an overview of the manual (see Appendix A for full version) and a 
rationale for the construction. 
I. Internal Firm Statements 
This section contains statements that relate to actions the firm can execute and are 
thus in the firm’s control. I identified six areas under which to code internal statements: 
(1) General Strategic Focus, (2) Financial Objectives, (3) Product Market Strategy, (4) 
Marketing Programs, (5) Business Scope, and (6) Non-Marketing Functional Activities. 





collaborators, and company (operationalized as operating efficiency) as well as 
innovation and branding. The Financial Objectives section categorizes items solely about 
the financial focus of the firm (profitability, growth, and market share). The Product 
Market Strategy area relates to changes in specific strategies (low-cost option, niche, and 
product differentiation). The Marketing Programs area focuses on the 4Ps of changes in 
products, pricing, promotions, or place (distribution). Business Scope relates to 
comments about the expansion or shrinking of the firm, as determined by acquisitions, 
consolidations, or diversification. Finally, the Non-Marketing Functional area includes 
statements about standard business aspects, that is, management, finance, operations, and 
accounting. 
II. External Firm Statements 
This section classifies items that are outside of the firms’ control, namely, 
changes in customer sentiment, competitive competition, and actions by collaborations. I 
also consider positive and negative changes in the economy, industry, and other potential 
events such as legal, currency, or trade acts. 
III. General Information 
The final section captures objective items, which include the count of words and 
sentences both inside and outside quotes, counts of future and past content, and the 
source of statements (i.e., CEO, CFO, COO, CMO, or Other Executive). I also record a 
subjective measure of the level of breadth and depth of the statements. That is, a high 
level of breadth, as defined in our manual, implies “complete coverage of all internal and 





“very detailed explanation with a clear timeline, deliverables, mentions of specific 
products and events.” 
Figure 1: Typology Classification 
 
Methodology  
Event Study Analysis 
To measure the impact of an individual statement, I regress the coded variable statements 
against any abnormal returns. This method is common in marketing and has been used, 
for example, in research on innovation (Sood and Tellis 2009) and corporate name 
changes (Horsky and Swyngedouw 1987). The event study methodology is standard 
(MacKinlay 1997, Srinivasan and Bharadwaj 2004). Events of interest are the dates of the 
earning statements. At this date, I can compute abnormal stock returns and assess 
differences by accounting for variation from the statements.  




















ARit = Retit – E[Retit], where (1)
Retit is the raw return for firm i on day t and E[Retit] is the expected return. I use the pre-
announcement period beginning 12 months (252 trading days) before and ending one 
month (21 trading days) before the earnings announcement and the Fama and French 
(1993) three-factor asset pricing model augmented with the momentum factor (Carhart 
1997) to compute expected returns. That is, I estimate the following model for each firm i 
and in the [-252; -21] window preceding an annual announcement:  
Retit-RiskFreet = αqi + βmkt,qi(RetMktt–RiskFreet) + βSMB,qiSMBt  
                                                      + βHML,qiHMLt + βUMD,qiUMDt + εit, where (2)
RiskFreet is the risk-free rate, RetMktt is the market return, SMBt is the difference in 
returns between small and large firms, HMLt is the difference in returns between high- 
and low-value firms, and UMDt is the Charhart (1997) momentum factor.  
Next, I use the estimates of market ( ˆ mkt,qi), SMB ( ˆ SMB,qi), HML ( ˆ HML,qi), 
and UMD ( ˆ UMD,qi) coefficients (risk factor loadings) to compute abnormal returns (
itAR ) for each firm i and day t in the event window around the announcement q, as the 
difference between the actual and expected return. I aggregate ARit over the duration of 
the event window to compute cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for each firm i and 











I look for response differences between firms that make or miss their earnings, by 
estimating separate response models for two situations: made earnings and missed 
earnings. That is, once the CAR is calculated, I estimate the impact of each individual 
statement on the response to the statement, taking into account earnings surprise, book-
to-market, level of earnings, industry sales, and whether the firm is “Hi Tech.” Two 















SF = Strategic Focus 
FIN = Financial Groups 
PMS = Product Market Strategy 
MM = Marketing Mix 
BS = Business Scope 
Func = Functional Business Unit 
EXT = External Factors 
Control Factors = industry factor, earnings surprise, book to market, size, Hi-
Tech. 
Calendar Portfolio Analysis with Time-Varying Risk Factor Loadings 
To estimate the long-term impact of a statement, I use the calendar-time portfolio 
approach, which is the traditional and most conservative method for assessing delayed 
market reaction, is advocated by Fama (1998), and is “robust to the most serious 
statistical problems” (Mitchell and Stafford 2000, p. 291). This method is particularly 
appropriate for empirical situations in which events are clustered in time and cross-
sectional dependency might be present (my event periods overlap as they are within a 3-
month period). Sorescu, Shankar, and Kushwaha (2007) were the first to use the 
calendar-time portfolio approach in marketing literature, and I closely follow their 
method.  
The calendar-time portfolio approach involves creating a portfolio of securities 
based on some attribute of interest, estimating a risk model for the portfolio, and testing 
for the significance of the intercept in the estimated risk model. Securities are placed into 





sufficient time to react to this new information (typically a few days). As portfolios 
require a minimum of 20 firms, I only create portfolios of items for the positive values of 
these statements. The securities are held in the portfolio for various time periods ranging 
from days to months and years depending on the researcher’s beliefs about how long the 
market takes to fully incorporate all relevant information into the security valuation and 
to correct the initial mispricing. To assess the significance of the valuation adjustment, a 
risk model is fitted to the time series of portfolio returns. For example, a Fama-French 
(1993) portfolio model augmented with Carhart’s (1997) momentum factor has the 
following form: 
Retpt-RiskFreet = αp + βmkt,p(RetMktt–RiskFreet) + βSMB,pSMBt  
                                                                                 + βHML,pHMLt + βUMD,pUMDt + εpt. (5)
The intercept in model (5) reflects the average return the risk profile of portfolio p 
does not explain, and is interpreted as an abnormal return due to the attribute used to 
form portfolio p. If a significant αp is found, the belief is that the market initially did not 
correctly incorporate the value implications of the signal contained in the information set 
used to form portfolio p. By varying the portfolio formation rules, the researcher can 
assess the impact of alternative factors on the observed phenomena. Under the efficient 
markets hypothesis, the stock market should immediately impound all value-relevant 
public information into the stock valuation and the future stock returns should not be 
associated with any past information. Under efficient markets, no mispricing exists and 
the intercept in equation (5) should not differ from zero.  
Recent research in finance has highlighted issues with the basic calendar portfolio 
method. Specifically, it has questioned the assumption that the portfolio risk factor 
loadings (coefficients) are constant over time. Barber and Lyon (1997), for example, note 
that this assumption is not plausible, as portfolio risk characteristics might change over 





One, portfolio rebalancing (some securities being added and some removed from the 
portfolio over time) changes the composition of securities and, as a result, the risk profile 
of the portfolio also changes. Two, the risk factor loadings might change over time for a 
portfolio even if no rebalancing occurs. These considerations suggest the risk factor 
loadings should be modeled as time varying (Fama 1998). Some empirical evidence 
suggests significant biases in estimation of abnormal returns might result if this 
heterogeneity in the risk factor loadings is not properly modeled (Ang and Kristensen 
2009, Jacobson and Mizik 2009).  
In light of this evidence, I explicitly model time-varying risk factor loadings in 
my calendar-time portfolio approach. Specifically, I first follow the standard approach for 
forming a calendar-time portfolio as described, for example, in Sorescu et al. (2007). 
That is, I create my three portfolios as follows. Three days after the date of the annual 
statement, I place the security into a portfolio based on the statement. I will then have as 
many portfolios as coded variables. I hold the security in the portfolio for six months and 
estimate equation (6), which allows for time-varying risk factor loadings and high-
frequency data correction:  






[βmkt,pqτ(RetMktt-τ-RiskFreet-τ) + βSMB,pqτSMBt-τ  
                                                                + βHML,pqτHMLt-τ + βUMD,pqτUMDt-τ] + εpt, where 
(6)
qQ is a set of indicator variables equal to 1 when the rebalancing period is q and zero 
otherwise, and the other variables are defined as previously. αp is the intercept in model 
(6). It reflects the estimate of abnormal return for portfolio p. 
This specification accounts for the varying portfolio risk associated with 
rebalancing (i.e., the firms in the portfolio change every time new announcements occur 
and their stock is added or removed from the portfolio) and accommodates potential 





loadings are stable over short periods and treats them as constant for the duration of 
period q.  
Further, model (6) incorporates the Lewellen and Nagel (2006) correction for 
estimation with high-frequency data. Lewellen and Nagel (2006) advocate including both 
current and lagged risk factors into the risk model when using high-frequency data. They 
observe that although daily data allow for more precise estimates, non-synchronous 
prices (i.e., a delay in a response to common effects) can have a significant impact on the 
estimation of short-window risk covariates. Because I use daily data, following Lewellen 
and Nagel (2006), I include both current and lagged risk factors in my models.  
Summary Statistics 
The full data sample contains 1,745 annual announcements. Table 1a reports the 
summary statistics for this large data sample. The average firm has a market 
capitalization of $5.9 billion, whereas the median firm has a market cap of only $914 
million. This skewness is common in financial data sets. Table 1b shows an industry level 
count of the data.  Not surprisingly, most firms are classified in the manufacturing and 
services industry. Note that there are zero finance, insurance, and real estate firms, as I 
removed these from the sample.  
As Table 1c shows, the average statement had 1,555 words with an average of 
only 230 coming directly from the executives. The rest of the statements were filled with 
a mix of descriptive numbers, content about the firm, and some future statements. Also, 
although 3.9 statements on average addressed the current period, only 2.0 were forward 
looking. As for breadth versus depth, I measured both on a 7-point scale and found them 





CEO, whereas only 9.2% were from the CFO, 2.1% from the COO, .1% from the CMO, 
and 1.8% from other executives (vice presidents, directors, etc.). 
Table 1: General Summary Statistics 
 
Table 1a: Sample Summary Statistics 
 N Mean Median Std Error 10th Percentile 
90th 
Percentile 
Assets 1745 5491.89 700.97 576.32 81.37 12105.22 
Market Cap 1745 5970.34 914.55 529.19 148.12 11750.95 
Sales 1745 4175.56 575.00 404.80 34.92 8362.90 
Net Income 1745 361.73 31.19 42.89 34.92 8362.90 
Book to 
Market 1745 1.01 0.74 .024 0.280 1.901 
 
Table 1b: Firm Count by Industry 
Area Count Percentage 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing 2 .11% 
Mining 132 7.56% 
Construction 23 1.32% 
Manufacturing 851 48.77% 
Transportation, Communications, Electric, Gas, and Sanitary 
Services 
249 14.27% 
Wholesale Trade 43 2.46% 
Retail Trade 70 4.01% 
Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate 0 0.00% 
Services 370 21.20% 
Public Administration 5 0.29% 
 
Table 1c: Statement Likelihood 
Variables MEAN STD 
Content_Words 1555.961 1343.850
Content_Wquotes 230.481 230.225 
Content_Sentences 56.092 47.762 
Content_SSentences 8.817 9.006 
Content_Future 2.031 2.528 
Content_Past 3.943 5.002 
Content_Depth 2.766 1.373 





GS_SourceCEO 0.874 0.332 
GS_SourceCOO 0.021 0.144 
GS_SourceCMO 0.001 0.024 
GS_SourceCFO 0.092 0.289 
GS_SourceOther 0.018 0.133 
 
Results 
I observe that marketing-related items are relatively prevalent as a topic of the 
commentaries company officials provide. For example, approximately 15% of the sample 
emphasize customers as a primary, or as an important, focus of firm strategy and 5% 
discuss branding strategy. A much greater proportion of the commentaries, however, 
emphasize firm innovation strategy and issues related to operational efficiency.  
Most of the official commentary focuses on explaining current results and 
discussing current strategies and products. Discussions of future strategic focus, intent, 
and specific marketing constructs are far less prevalent. As such, the primary focus is on 
the analysis of “current” items. 
Analysis 
(1) General Strategic Focus 
Interestingly, the most common current strategic item for executives to discuss 
was an increase in operating efficiency (21.6%), followed by innovation (19.8%), a focus 
on customers (14.3%), and collaborators (13%). Few made mention of a differential 
focus on competitors (1.7%) or branding (5.7%). Although all of these issues are 
important, the fact that executives spent little time  on branding is surprising, as the future 
income of a company—heavily related to branding—often makes up such a large part of 
its current valuation. In terms of future items, the only frequent mentions were for 





finding suggests companies are more concerned with explaining past results than 
discussing future directions.  
In terms of effectiveness, customer focus, innovation, operating efficiency, and 
collaboration have an impact on investor reactions. First, customer focus matters only 
when earnings have been met, which signals that perhaps, for missed earnings, the focus 
should be on other issues. An innovation focus induces a negative reaction when earnings 
are missed but a positive reaction when met. This focus might signal that investors are 
happy with the focus on new product development and research while the firm is beating 
expectations but not when the firm has missed earnings, and therefore firms should be 
focusing on earnings rather than long-term product development. A focus on operating 
efficiency, which might be expected to invoke a positive reaction under all conditions, 
only creates a positive response when the firm misses earnings, possibly because the firm 
appears, although missing expectations, to be focusing on quickly improving results. 
Finally, a focus on collaboration creates an increased negative response when firms miss 
earnings, again implying that their internal focus on increasing collaboration should have 






Table 2: Strategic Focus Results 
Table 2a: Statement Likelihood 
Variable -1 Rating 0 Rating +1 Rating Percent Mentioned 
Current Focus  
CustomerFocus 0 1496 249 14.3% 
Competitors 1 1716 28 1.7% 
Innovation 4 1400 341 19.8% 
OperateEfficiency 13 1368 364 21.6% 
Collaborate 3 1518 224 13.0% 
Branding 0 1645 100 5.7% 
 
Future Focus  
CustomerFocus 0 1655 90 5.2% 
Competitors 0 1738 7 0.4% 
Innovation 1 1594 150 8.7% 
OperateEfficiency 2 1639 104 6.1% 
Collaborate 0 1715 30 1.7% 
Branding 0 1713 32 1.8% 
 
Table 2b: Statement Impact 
Parameter Made Earnings Missed Earnings 
CustomerFocus -0.0177 (0.0034)* -0.0038 (0.0045) 
Competitors -0.0010 (0.0181) -0.0123 (0.0139) 
Innovation 0.01182 (0.0037)* -0.0142 (0.0042)* 
OperateEffic 0.00491 (0.0027) 0.01578 (0.0033)* 
Collaborate 0.00367 (0.0056) -0.0108 (0.0049)* 







(2) Financial Objectives 
As expected, a large percentage of firms discussed a focus on current profitability 
(34.5%) and growth (49%) but less of a focus on market share (7.4%). The numbers 
looking forward were similar, just slightly depressed with profitability at 11.5%, growth 
at 28%, and market share at 2.2% of the statements. The low focus on market share 
demonstrates the high internal focus most firms possess. 
The only item that appears to firm stock value is a focus on financial growth, 
which earns a negative investor response across earnings situations. This finding is 
surprising because growth is such a central issue for many firms. However, the results 
may show that all investors do not value growth the same way and that a differential view 
might exist between firms and investors. Alternatively, investors might interpret growth 
statements as cheap talk designed to divert focus from current earnings, and hence as a 
signal of problems. 
Table 3: Financial Objectives 
Table 3a: Statement Likelihood 
Variable -1 Rating 0 Rating +1 Rating Percent Mentioned 
Current Focus  
Profitability 53 1143 549 34.5% 
Growth 16 890 839 49.0% 
MktShare 1 1615 129 7.4% 
 
Future Focus  
Profitability 4 1544 197 11.5% 
Growth 3 1256 486 28.0% 
MktShare 0 1707 38 2.2% 
 
Table 3b: Statement Impact 
Parameter Made Earnings Missed Earnings 
Profitability 0.00262 (0.0027) 0.00308 (0.0034) 
Growth -0.0064 (0.0029)* -0.0141 (0.0032)* 






(3) Product Market Strategy 
The releases rarely used these items, and all firms combined discussed none of 
them more than 73 times total. Low cost (4.4%), niche (4.2%), and differentiation (3.3%) 
were all rare, and future focus was even lower at 0.5%, 0.6%, and 0.6%, respectively. 
None of these specific strategy focus comments have an impact on investor 
response, and many reasons exist for this null effect. Outside of the “normal” cases, these 
items of information might not be truly new to the investor. That is, investors are already 
aware that Southwest Airlines is a low-cost carrier, and strengthening this attribute 
doesn’t say make the investor aware of anything new. 
Table 4: Product-Market Strategy 
Table 4a: Statement Likelihood 
Variable -1 Rating 0 Rating +1 Rating Percent Mentioned 
Current Focus  
LowCost 3 1669 73 4.4% 
Niche 0 1672 73 4.2% 
Differentiation 0 1687 58 3.3% 
 
Future Focus  
LowCost 0 1737 8 0.5% 
Niche 0 1735 10 0.6% 
Differentiation 0 1734 11 0.6% 
 
Table 4b: Statement Impact 
Parameter Made Earnings Missed Earnings 
LowCost 0.00354 (0.0067) -0.0083 (0.0080) 
Niche 0.01399 (0.0098) 0.01102 (0.0118) 
Differentiation 0.00954 (0.0052) 0.01349 (0.0114) 
 





By far, the largest component discussed for firms is the product (26.8%), followed 
by place (15.4%), promotion (6.5%), and pricing (5.6%). For future items, the order 
remains the same: product (10.1%), place (4.9%), promotion (2.3%), and price (0.7%). 
 
Table 5: Marketing Mix/Strategy 
Table 5a: Statement Likelihood 
Variable -1 Rating 0 Rating +1 Rating Percent Mentioned 
Current Focus  
Product 3 1277 465 26.8% 
Price 11 1648 86 5.6% 
Promotion 3 1631 111 6.5% 
Place 9 1476 260 15.4% 
 
Future Focus  
Product 0 1568 177 10.1% 
Price 1 1733 11 0.7% 
Promotion 0 1704 41 2.3% 
Place 5 1660 80 4.9% 
 
Table 5c: Statement Impact 
Parameter Made Earnings Missed Earnings 
Product 0.01034 (0.0031)* 0.00066 (0.0041) 
Price -0.0005 (0.0045) -0.0015 (0.0075) 
Promotion 0.00723 (0.0057) 0.00561 (0.0079) 
Place -0.001 (0.0040) 0.00605 (0.0052) 
(5) Business Scope  
A large number of firms spoke about current and future acquisitions (23.5% and 
4.9%, respectively). The concept of consolidation was less common (11.1% currently and 
1.3% in the future), and diversification of the company even more rare: 3.5% in the 
present and .5% in the future. 
Consistent with general sentiment about acquisitions, firms that meet earnings 
exhibit a positive response to acquisitions. Given the negative long-term value 





Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford 2001) this finding is surprising. However, investors might 
also view these results as a way for the firm to responsibly invest extra cash. Inversely, a 
focus on consolidation is a negative event for positive earnings and a positive event for 
negative earnings. That is, investors might view consolidation for firms that are flush as 
untimely, as the firm is currently thriving, consistent with results from behavioral finance 
showing that investors often hold onto winners long past the prime time to sell. For firms 
that miss earnings, consolidation is a positive event, demonstrating how investors would 
like the firm to concentrate on core business and sell of parts of the company that might 
be underperforming. 
Table 6: Business Scope 
Table 6a: Statement Likelihood 
Variable -1 Rating 0 Rating +1 Rating Percent Mentioned 
Current Focus  
Acquisitions 0 1335 410 23.5% 
Consolidation 0 1552 193 11.1% 
Diversification 0 1684 61 3.5% 
 
Future Focus  
Acquisitions 1 1660 84 4.9% 
Consolidation 0 1723 22 1.3% 
Diversification 2 1737 6 0.5% 
 
Table 6b: Statement Impact 
Parameter Made Earnings Missed Earnings 
Acquisitions 0.01121 (0.0039)* -0.0060 (0.0042) 
Consolidation -0.0118 (0.0043)* 0.01255 (0.0049)* 







(6) Non-Marketing Functional Strategic Focus 
These variables are meant to compare the level and importance of various 
business fields across earnings. As Table 7 shows, the most common discussion topic 
among firms was operations, followed by financial, accounting measures, and changes in 
management. Going forward, a slight change occurs as accounting measures become 
most common, followed by financial, and then operational and managerial, because many 
firms discuss future financials, but often not changes in actual operating performance. 
Investors find a focus on operations valuable when earnings are below 
expectations. However, they also value a general discussion of finances when earnings 
are positive. This finding is a bit surprising given that an individual mention of growth is 
negative. However, because focus of operations is measured a count variable as opposed 
to a dummy, highlighting the positive through a discussion of a firm’s positive financial 
characteristics might be a good thing. 
Table 7: Non-Marketing Functional Areas 
Table 7a: Statement Likelihood 
Variables MAX MEAN STD 
Current Focus 
Management 2 0.054 0.232 
Finance 14 0.734 1.222 
Operations 22 0.914 1.545 
Accounting 28 0.699 1.724 
 
Future Focus 
Management 1 0.002 0.041 
Finance 4 0.079 0.344 
Operations 4 0.062 0.319 







Table 7b: Statement Impact 
Parameter Made Earnings Missed Earnings 
Management 0.00343 (0.0082) -0.0132 (0.0083) 
Finance 0.00341 (0.0013)* 0.00208 (0.0015) 
Operations -0.0009 (0.0008) 0.00584 (0.0011)* 
Accounting -0.0000 (0.0006) -0.0002 (0.0008) 
 
II. External Issues 
I did not find a large number of external statements about the C’s. In particular, 
customer sentiment was the most common (5.2%), followed by changes in competitors 
(2.1%) and finally collaborators (1.8%). From the perspective of the external context, 
firms discussed more negative (average of .35) than positive items (.233). Interestingly, 
discussion of the economy or industry in general was rare, perhaps because firms become 
concerned about referring too much to issues beyond their control. 
In terms of impact, these items were very important. Interestingly, noting a 
positive change in customer sentiment invoked a negative response on firm value. This 
finding is a bit surprising as intuition says a positive change in sentiment should be a 
good thing for a company as it will likely lead to more sales, higher cash flow, and better 
financials. However, the negative reaction might be due to the belief that external factors, 
rather than the company’s actions, caused the increase in value, thereby showing the 
company was either irresponsible or lucky this quarter. Also, the company might at the 
same time have hedged overly positive returns to the customer, hinting that future 
changes in customer sentiment are not guaranteed. Next, positive changes in 
collaborators also induced a negative response. Similar to the customer sentiment, 
successful collaboration should create a positive reaction but instead created a negative 





collaboration either (a) highlights that the firm was benefiting from positive external 
factors or (b) might not hold true in another time. 
Although the discussion of general points with negative context had no impact, 
items of positive context had a negative response. Again, this finding is surprising 
because one would expect a positive response here. However, as with customer sentiment 
and collaboration, investors might view these events as “luck,” thereby highlighting a 
lack of firm-attributed success or the possibility that the event will not hold true later on. 
In contrast, discussion of the economy had a positive reaction under both missed and 
made positions. However, these are categorical variables, measuring only positive or 
negative relations to the economy, and does not include other context-related events such 
as supply issues, weather patterns, and so forth. Finally, industry related statements have 
a significantly positive impact on value, although only when returns are missed, perhaps 
because under a positive industry change, along with missed earnings, investors could be 
looking for a silver lining. This industry effect is in stark contrast to, for example, the 
rationale for the reaction to customer sentiment. However, positive changes in the 







Table 8: External Conditions 
Table 8a: Statement Likelihood 
Variables MAX MEAN STD 
Current Focus 
CustSent 1 0.052 0.300 
Competitors 1 0.021 0.159 
Collaborators 1 0.018 0.160 
NegContext 20 0.350 0.959 
PosContext 10 0.233 0.631 
Economy 1 0.009 0.295 
Industry 1 -0.002 0.285 
 
Future Focus 
CustSent 1 0.016 0.139 
Competitors 1 0.002 0.059 
Collaborators 1 0.002 0.048 
NegContext 20 0.052 0.545 
PosContext 10 0.050 0.333 
Economy 1 0.000 0.127 
Industry 1 0.003 0.140 
 
Table 8b: Statement Impact 
Parameter Made Earnings Missed Earnings 
CustSent -0.0155 (0.0044)* 0.00548 (0.0055) 
Competitors 0.0137 (0.0094) 0.00014 (0.0082) 
Collaborators -0.0197 (0.0091)* -0.0138 (0.01) 
NegContext -0.0011 (0.0018) -0.0012 (0.0013) 
PosContext -0.0062 (0.0021)* -0.0076 (0.0021)* 
Economy 0.01611 (0.0046)* 0.01155 (0.0043)* 
Industry -0.0075 (0.0045) 0.01563 (0.0053)* 
 
III. Other  
Due to issues of multicollinearity among the general model, I excluded certain 
items, including who spoke in the statement and how many sentences existed (as this is 
highly correlated with the number of words). Interestingly, longer statements had a 
negative response for firms that made earnings, but not for those that missed them. Also, 





negative response is not clear, but might be a result of too much cheap talk and of 
investors’ preference for core numbers and facts over softer descriptions. 
Further, statements about the future helped when firms beat earnings and 
statements about the past hurt when firms missed earnings. This finding may be due to 
the possibility that investors want firms that beat earnings to focus on future events, and 
they want firms that miss earnings to not focus on the past. That is, instead of explaining 
past events, companies should work toward fixing the situation that caused them. Finally, 
breadth of statements helped earnings. However, breadth of statement is a subjective 
matter referring to the different number of business units or organizational matters 
covered. Therefore, by describing different aspects of the company, the executive might 
be able to highlight positive aspects of the firm and as such mitigate the negative impact 
of the missed earnings. 
Table 9: General Items 
Table 9a: Statement Impact 
Parameter Made Earnings Missed Earnings 
Content_Words -0.0000 (0.0000)* -0.0000 (0.0000) 
Content_Wquotes -0.0000 (0.0000)* -0.0000 (0.0000)* 
Content_Future 0.00217 (0.0005)* -0.0008 (0.0009) 
Content_Past -0.0000 (0.0003) -0.0025 (0.0003)* 
Content_Depth -0.0019 (0.0018) -0.0011 (0.0019) 
Content_Breadth -0.0007 (0.0017) 0.01337 (0.0017)* 
 
Long-Term Returns 
Surprisingly, I found little relationship between the type of comments noted and 
the long-term impact. Appendix G shows the abnormal returns (i.e., alphas) that result 
from portfolios created based on a single variable across all firms. For example, if the 
statement brought up Customer Focus, that firm would be in the portfolio. Portfolios 





However, such a small number of variables showed significant effects that determining 
whether any are different from zero is difficult. A second analysis (see Appendix F) splits 
the portfolios again by whether they made or missed earnings. Again, only a non-
significant number of variables were different from zero.  
The takeaway from this essay is that although the statements often mention 
marketing or changes in finances for future, one can rarely glean anything predictable 
from such information. That said, there might be a better way to collect data from the 
statements to determine future profitability based on changes in communication. 
DISCUSSION 
Firms constantly communicate with financial markets about their performance 
and future prospects, and investors consider earnings a premiere relevant information 
item, followed by the analysts and market participants. Several studies in accounting have 
proposed “earnings fixation hypotheses” (i.e., analysts’ fixation on earnings and relative 
disregard of some other value-relevant information) and documented evidence consistent 
with this hypothesis. However, evidence shows that non-financial metrics are also 
important in determining firm value and help the financial markets form expectations of 
firm future performance. Because many firms have intangible assets whose value is 
greater than the value of their tangible assets, some authors argue that the state of 
intangible assets might better reflect the overall health of a firm. As such, marketing 
metrics can provide signals about firm future performance (incremental to current 
accounting performance numbers) and/ or might serve as indicators of earnings quality.  
This study assesses the information content of the non-financial metrics in CEO 





that researchers have not yet explored. Although the marketing literature has examined 
isolated non-financial disclosure items—for example, new product announcements, 
company name changes, celebrity endorsements—I examine a whole host of marketing 
constructs simultaneously and assess their relative impact on the market response. This 
study also contributes to the voluntary disclosure literature in accounting. 
I provide empirical evidence of the phenomenon, its consequences, and stock 
market reactions to qualitative statements. I propose (and test this proposition) that non-
financial disclosure is a useful communication tool firms can employ to help emphasize 






Table 10: Key Results 




























Table 10 highlights some of the key results from this study. From a marketer’s 
perspective, a handful of insights provide interesting results that researchers should 
further explore and investigate. First, the most positive results come from statements on 
acquisitions (only for positive firms) and consolidations (only for negative firms). This 
finding is surprising from a results perspective but perhaps not from a layperson 
perspective. Second, there were a number for which one would expect—and see—a 
neutral impact, including price, promotion, and place. Similarly, branding, 
diversification, and external competitors also had a neutral effect. Third, firms should 
bring up product development and innovation during positive earnings situations. 
Although this issue should be important for companies, bringing it up under negative 
earnings situations only decreases firm value. Similarly, highlighting product 
development and innovation as the cause of positive earnings  will add value. 
Surprisingly, focusing on the customer will have a negative impact. Focusing on the 
future, when the firm has done well, creates value as well. This finding suggests simply 
resting on solid returns is not sufficient, and that the marketplace rewards firms that 





much” was written lead to a negative return. Investors might see lengthy statements as a 
cover-up for poor future results. 
Research into the value of communication has been ongoing since well before 
Greenberg (1967), who argued, among other points, that the “focus for decision always 
revolves around the specific content of the problem.” Generally good advice, this 
statement posits that perhaps little within the communications field is repeatable, and as 
such, making determinations about future behavior based on single scenarios might be 
difficult. However, some items appear more likely to be referenced in different situations. 
Future Research 
A natural extension to this coding would be seeing how these communications 
change over time, particularly when firms are in great financial distress as occurred in the 
late 2000s. Although a hand-coding extension process might prove time and cost 
intensive, this coding could act as a base for natural language processing techniques. 
Using these data to see how firms attempted to “spin” their financial situations, 
commitment to marketing, and forward-looking behavior during this period would give 
some excellent insight into what type of language matters when the economy, not just 
individual firms, is in a downward spiral. 
A second area for future research would be the statement response to competitors. 
A good number of firms might alter statements to implicitly refer to competitors’ 
earnings. This practice might not be a good idea, and is ripe for an empirical test. 
A third extension would be the value of future statements. Although I did not find 





this information should be valuable as it is says what the company will do, for example, 













In this section I present general extensions to this dissertation followed by 
extensions arising directly from the individual essays. That is, one relevant extension to 
both essays is an investigation of competitive reactions to both marketing spending and 
marketing communications. Most companies take into the account the actions and 
hypothetical choices of competitors when making nearly all decisions. While this is not 
the only consideration for managerial action, it is vital to solid decision making (Shugan, 
2002). Further, Montgomery, Moore and Urbany (2005) showed that managers often 
consider the decision making of a competitor even though the focus is typically 
contemporaneous or backward looking. This implies that there may exist an under-
appreciation for the expected actions of a competitor. 
However, firm competition can come in a number of ways, and need not be a 
direct advertising or price battle, although this is predominant in the literature. That is, 
behavior can be influenced at both the firm and the product level. At the firm level, 
competitive behavior may influence the corporate structure of the firm, as well as 
aggregate budgeting decisions. At the individual product level, price, promotions and 
consumer channel outlets can be influenced. In between these two groups are decisions 
related to new product innovations and the methods in which these innovations are 
developed. 
Future Directions From Essay 1 
Several interesting directions exist for future research in this area. The clearest 
avenue is to explore the magnitude and timing of market reaction to other marketing-
related phenomena (e.g., brand extensions, company name changes, major branding 





research topic in marketing. Researchers might be interested in exploring not only the 
changes in future operating performance, which is explored in this study, but also 
examining possible changes in riskiness of the firm as a result of changes in its marketing 
and R&D strategies. 
Ways to improve the first study include the following: 1) moving to solely 
calendar time portfolio analysis (CTPR) 2) industry level analysis 3) utilizing annual data 
or pure advertising data, and 4) investigating extreme cases of changes in spending 
behavior.  
As CTPR analysis has become the standard for the analysis of long term abnormal 
returns, moving to this metric is appropriate for the long term analysis, which is currently 
a mixture of BHAR and portfolio returns. Also, CTPR would allow for the simple 
implementation of time varying betas. That is, the risk factors of the portfolio will be 
updated on a regular basis to follow changes in the composition of the portfolio over the 
10 year time span. While preliminary long term results are qualitatively similar, testing 
the dynamics of drift using the CTPR returns could be valuable.  
Sometimes a market anomaly can be driven by one particular group, as opposed 
to the aggregate sample (as shown for satisfaction in Jacobson and Mizik, 2009), 
implying further data segmentation. While the current study considers segmentation 
across size, book value, and recession/not-recession time periods, the long term studies 
do not explore specific industry effects. Specifically, stratifying the sample across 
different technology industry classification codes might provide another sensitivity test 





Third, running this study using annual data would allow one to change the 
analysis from SG&A to an advertising based focus. While SG&A has been successfully 
used in past research (Dutta, 1999; Mizik and Jacobson, 2003), it is an overestimate of 
marketing spending. While SG&A does include advertising and other selling expenses, it 
also includes some administrative and executive payroll expenses which are not directly 
relevant to marketing. As such, moving to an annual sample would allow for 
determination of changes in R&D and Advertising, which would allow analysis of a 
specific type of marketing spending. However, there are some drawbacks to moving to an 
annual analysis. First, drift has been documented to be lower for annual samples than for 
quarterly samples, implying that un-appreciation and earnings focus may be lower. 
Second, the smaller sample size will make anomalies harder to find. Third, expectations 
of total spending will be muddled from the previous year as spending for R&D will be 
known for 3 of the 4 quarters already, and some advertising information may have been 
divulged along with the quarterly SG&A expenditures. Thus, the pureness of what 
constitutes a difference has to be clearly defined. Still, there is merit to considering the 
annual data, and then looking for earnings adjustments over the next 4 quarters. 
Fourth, it may be possible that these results are driven by outliers. That is, firms 
which are drastically changing strategies, as opposed to those which have merely small 
differences in allocations. The current discrete classification does not distinguish between 
these types, implying that analyzing firms with small and big changes as separate groups 





Future Directions From Essay 2 
A natural extension would be to see how communications change over time, and in 
particular how firms communicate when in great financial distress as in the late 2000s. 
While a hand coding extension process may prove time and cost intensive, it is possible 
that this coding could act as a base for natural language processing techniques. A 
computer based coding scheme would allow the dataset to be easily scaled. Using the 
dataset to see how firms attempted to “spin” their financial situation, commitment to 
marketing and forward looking behavior during this period would give insight into what 
type of language matters when the economy, not just individual firms, are in a downward 
spiral. 
Second, while this paper primarily investigates how statements about current actions 
impact performance, the future indicators are not as strongly considered. That is, the 
statements analyzed are more focused on explaining past behavior than detailing future 
outcomes. Potentially, forward looking information may be much more valuable as it is 
saying what the company will do, as opposed to revising what is already known. A more 
detailed analysis of statements of future events (i.e. planned acquisitions, changes in the 
marketing mix, etc), may give an indication of when talk about the future is “cheap” or 
when it signals real actions. One of the issues in Essay 2 was that only a small number of 
firms had significant dialogues about the future. Thus, more studies determining a) what 
makes some firms more likely to look forward and then b) analyzing the real actions 
would provide valuable input as to when forward looking statements have merit. 
Third, there is also a need to see if the results in Essay 2 hold across differing types of 





ownership. These factors may also contribute to the level of press that the statements 
generate, which could tested with an analysis of financial news sources around the date of 
the announcement. This type of study could provide insight into what types of statements 
are commonly carried by the news media, and as such also more likely to be conveyed to 
investors.  
A final area would be statement responses to competitors. That is, firms may alter 
statements to implicitly refer to earnings of competitors. This may have unexpected 
consequences and is also ripe for an empirical test. 
Conclusion 
These two essays demonstrate first that positive changes in marketing spending 
does not automatically pay dividends and second, investigated how non-financial 
communications accompany firm actions and results. Specifically, the first essay finds 
that changes in marketing and R&D investments are only appreciated by the financial 
markets when they directly result in earnings, not when the investments are made. This 
highlights the importance of looking at the long term value of events that might not be 
priced immediately and also provides evidence on how managers should interpret 
investor reactions. The results provide justification for marketing and R&D budgets in 
general and for maintaining them in the face of temporary earnings reductions. 
Consequently, we believe that managers should thus take a more patient approach to the 
reactions of investors. The second essay describes a new dataset of communications 
between firms and markets that highlights how marketing information is transmitted to 
the investment community. By coding 1745 annual investor statements, I am able to 





investors, how these constructs compare to items from other business divisions, and the 
likelihood of these constructs under different scenarios. This is the first attempt to content 
analyze and empirically examine the non-financial statements made by top company 
executives at the time of earnings announcements. While this is an area that has been 
explored at a basic level in the accounting literature, we bring it to the marketing field to 
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The main objective of this study is to investigate the patterns of non-financial 
disclosure in quarterly earnings statements and the prominence of marketing constructs 
and metrics. Specifically, we want to assess the value of adding non-financial strategic 
statements and to explore whether a firm can manage the market’s reactions to its 
earnings announcements by revealing its strategic plans or providing explanations of 
reported results.  Furthermore, we seek to determine which metrics are more effective in 
moderating market response under positive (or negative) earnings. 
 
Brief Project Background 
When public firms announce quarterly earnings, in addition to required financial 
disclosure, the top management has an opportunity to make additional statements to 
highlight their future strategic plans and/or to provide explanations of reported results. 
Many firms choose to issue such non-required statements along with the required 
financial reports. Typically, the statements come from the CEO of the company or from 
another top company executive (because in the majority of cases they come from the 
CEO, hereafter we refer to these statements as CEO statements). These statements are 
usually very short, just a few sentences long, do not have a set structure or content and 
are issued at the discretion of the management. Typically, significant effort goes into 
formulation of these statements: they are very carefully crafted, discussed and 
preconcerted by the whole top management team.  
Why do so many firms choose to issue such statements and put so much effort 
into designing them? How do firms select the specific items that would be mentioned? 
The success and failure of the firm to meet the analysts’ earnings expectations depends 





emphasize in their statements. The CEO non-financial statements are an interesting and 
an understudied phenomenon. For example, it is not known which major categories of 
factors are discussed and how prevalent marketing constructs are relative to constructs 
reflecting other operating functions. The effects of these statements are also not known.  
Given the prevalence of these statements and the organizational attention and 
effort awarded to designing them, we have reasons to believe that top management views 
the opportunity to use non-financial disclosures as a tool to communicate with the 
financial markets to help manage expectations and market reaction. We also have reasons 
to believe that this non-financial communication might be a valuable tool. It might be 
valuable to the stock market participants and might help firms manage expectations about 
the firm future performance.  
Indeed, several authors have noted the inherent trade-off the management faces 
between meeting earnings targets and investing into the long term intangible assets. 
Sometimes earnings are not reflective of the future, but come at the expense of future 
profits. Building strong marketing assets and capabilities (brands, loyal customer base, 
etc.) requires significant investments which might be recouped only in the future. The 
non-financial disclosure provides an opportunity for the management team to emphasize 
performance elements which are not reflected in the current accounting performance 
numbers. That is, the management can highlight increased spending on brand building or 
socially-responsible business initiatives as the source of increased costs and lower 
profitability. 
We propose to explore the content and the effect of CEO disclosures on the stock 
market response to earnings announcements. CEO statements might reflect firm 
commitment to their long-term assets and provide an opportunity to assess the differential 
implications of these assets for firm performance. On the other hand, these disclosures 
might be just a “cheap talk” with no value implications. In this study we seek to assess 
the content patterns of the CEO non-financial statements at the time firms announce 
quarterly earnings results and the financial market’s reaction to such statements. We 
address the following questions:  
 What is the prevalence of different information items contained in the CEO 
statements at the time of earnings announcements?   
 How prominent are marketing-related constructs and metrics in the CEO 
statements? 
 How do financial markets react to these CEO statements? Is there valuable 
information in these statements or are they viewed as “cheap talk” by the stock 
market? 
 Does the specificity of the statement have a moderating effect on the magnitude 
of the market response?  
 Does the firm credibility moderate the market response to CEO statements?  
 Do differential effects exist across different industries and across different 
performance conditions? 
 
Relation to Previous Research 
 
The phenomenon of non-financial disclosure has been studied in accounting 





content of such disclosures and has not explored marketing-related content. In the 
marketing literature several event studies have explored the effects of non-financial 
disclosures/announcements (e.g., new product announcements, company name changes, 
celebrity endorsements) on firm value. These studies focused on a single specific type of 
disclosure. Some studies have examined the content of annual reports, such as Yadav, 
Prabhu and Chandy (2007), which analyzes the level of CEO attention towards 
innovation in the banking industry.  This study differentiates itself by examining a host of 





General Coding Procedures 
 
The statements will be coded into two major categories: 
I. firm statements about itself 
II. firm statements about the forces and conditions outside of it control 
 
In addition, the statements can be about the  
A. PAST = to explain the reported performance and current events, or  
B. FUTURE = to say what the firm is planning to do in the future1. 
 
 Therefore there are 2 identical sets of variables for PAST-related 
statements (e.g., SF_CustomerFocus_P, SF_Competitors_P, etc.) and for 
the FUTURE-related statements (e.g, SF_CustomerFocus_F, SF_ 
Competitors_F, etc.) 
 When several Constructs are mentioned, all should be noted and coded in 
the file. 
 Generally a value of (1) should be assigned when there is an increase in 
the Construct and value of (-1) when there is a decrease in the Construct, 
and a value of (9) when no directional change is noted. 
 
The statements should be coded as follows: 
 
I. Firm statements about itself: 
 
1. General “Big-picture” view of strategic direction/ focus of the 
firm 
 





 1: Customer initiatives recently initiated (e.g., 
improvements in service quality), focus on improved 
customer satisfaction 
 






 1: Comments detailing an increased focus on competitors 
actions, and responding to those actions 
 
-1: Comments detailing a decreased focus on competitors 





 1: Discussion of an increased focus on innovation and 
research; Increased R&D spending. 
 






 1: Focus on improving operational efficiency due to new 







-1: Discussion of manufacturing increased costs; 






 1: Entering into partnerships or other joint ventures, 
whether buyers, suppliers or channel partners. 
 





 1: General statements about “investing more into” or 
“focusing on” brands/brand portfolio 
 
 -1: Reduced focus on branding  
 
2. Financial Objectives  
 





 1: Focus on improved or increased profitability 
 
-1: Reduced focus on profitability, in comparison to 





 1: Focus on improved or increased growth 
 
-1: Reduced focus on growth, in comparison to 





 1: Focus on improved or increased market share 
 
-1: Reduced focus on market share, in comparison to 
profitability or growth 
 
 
3. Product-Market Strategy (i.e., general strategy to achieve goals) 
 






 1: Stated goal to be the low-cost provider to the broad 
market—high efficiency necessary to achieve this goal. 
 






PMS _ Niche 
 1: Focused on a few target markets or small, profitable 
segments 
 








 1: Unique products that focus on effectiveness instead of 
efficiency; generally still a broader marketplace unlike 
niche 
 







4. Marketing Strategy (Marketing Mix Elements) 
 





 1: Increase in a number of products; a new product 
introduction 
 






 1: Price increases on one or more items 
 





 1: Increased advertising/promotional effort, more funding 
for promotional activities, increase sales force 
 
-1: Decrease in advertising/promotional effort, less $  





 1: Increase in distributor network or new distribution 
method  
 
-1: Decrease in distributor network or elimination/phasing 
out of some distribution method  
 
 
5. Business Scope 
 











 1: Focusing on “core” business lines or acquisition of a 





 1: entering new business or acquired a firm that is not 
related to the core business  
 
 
6. Non-Marketing Functional Areas 
 









This item counts the number of finance related statements.  
For example, those related to financing, credit issues, 
equity offerings, debt re-structuring, etc.   
Operations OPER_Points 
Func_OPER 
This item counts the numbers of changes in operations, 
such as channel flows, bottle necks, channel distributors, 




This item counts the numbers of changes in accounting 
measures, such as one time extraordinary items, 








II. Firm statements about the forces and conditions outside of it control 
 
Grouping Construct Meaning 
External Customer Sentiment 
EXT_CustSent 
 1: Positive change in customer tastes, styles and interests. 
 
-1: Negative change in customer tastes, styles and interests 
External Competitors 
EXT_Competitors 
 1: An increase in product competition 
 
-1: Statemtns about a decrease in competition; failures or 
mistakes made by competitors 
External Collaborators 
EXT_Collaborators 
 1: Positive actions made by financial or product 
collaborators.  This could include decreased prices, 
increased commitments or better communication.  
Collaborators can include buyers, suppliers, and other 
channel partners. 
 
-1: Negative actions made by financial or product 
collaborators.  This could include increased financial 
pressure, decreased commitments or poor communication.  
Collaborators can include buyers, suppliers, and other 
channel partners. 
External Negative Context  
EXT_NegContext 
This item counts the number of positive comments related 
to changes in the economy, legal field or industry.  
Examples could relate to favorable trade acts, currency 
changes, increases in consumer buying power or interest 
rate changes. 
External Positive Context 
EXT_NegContext 
This item counts the number of negative comments related 
to changes in the economy, legal field or industry.  
Examples could relate to unfavorable trade acts, currency 




 1: General positive economic developments 
 
-1: General adverse economic developments 
External Industry 
EXT_Industry 
 1: General positive development throughout the industry 
(rising tide lifts all boats), e.g. Oil companies 
 
-1: Adverse developments in the industry, e.g., dumping of 
Japanese steel hurt the domestic steel market 
 
 
III. Statistics and Miscellaneous Items 
 
Grouping Construct Meaning 
Content Total Word Count 
Content_Words 
Total word count of the voluntary disclosure statement.  





Company” statement often found at the end. 
Content Total Quotation 
Count 
Content_WQuotes 
Total word count of all direct statements by management 
of the company.  These statements are listed in quotations 
disclosure statement 
Content Total Sentence 
Count 
Content_Sentences 
Total sentence count of the voluntary disclosure statement.  
This does not count the Balance sheet and the “about 
Company” statement often found at the end. 
Content Total Quotation 
Sentence Count 
Content_SSentences 
Total sentence count of all direct statements by 
management of the company.  These statements are listed 
in quotations disclosure statement 
Content Future Content 
Content 
Total number of sentences relating to future events, 
actions or activities 
Content Past Content 
Content_Past 
Total number of sentences relating to current events, 
actions or activities 
Content Level of Depth 
Content_Depth 
Scale the depth of the explanation given as a range on how 
clear the explanation given for the disclosure. For instance, 
 
1: Low – poor explanation of what happened or is planned, 
e.g. “reduced earnings reflect an economic downturn…” 
 
4: Neutral – explanation has some details but still misses 
key points. 
 
7: High – very detailed explanation with a clear timeline, 
deliverables, mentions of specific products and events, etc. 
Content Level of Breadth 
Content_Breadth 
Scale the breadth of the explanation given as a range on 
how clear the explanation given for the disclosure. For 
instance, 
 
1: Low – very few aspects of the company, and their 
products are discussed. 
 
4: Neutral – explanation has details about some aspects of 
is occurring for the company, but still misses some areas. 
 
7: High – complete coverage of all internal and external 




CEO, CMO, etc. 
GS_Source 
A set of dummy variables to capture the statement source: 
d(CEO)=1 if CEO is quoted, 0 otherwise 
d(COO)=1 if COO is quoted 0 otherwise 
d(CMO)=1 if CMO is quoted 0 otherwise 
d(CFO)=1 if CFO is quoted 0 otherwise 
d(Other)=1 if another executive is quoted 
 





If any other strategic constructs are discussed about the 





If any other strategic constructs are discussed about the 





Appendix B: Counts of Statement Mentions for Essay 2 
This chart shows the number of firms that brought up a particular type of issue in the 
statement. The last column is a significance test on the difference between the Missed 










SF_CustomerFocus 630 96 866 153 0.29 
SF_Competitors 712 14 1 1004 14 0.46 
SF_Innovation 1 577 148 3 823 193 0.61 
SF_OperateEfficiency 4 589 133 9 779 231 0.06 
SF_Collaborate 628 98 3 890 126 0.27 
SF_Branding 694 32 951 68 0.04 
Fin_Profitability 20 504 202 33 639 347 0.01 
Fin_Growth 8 372 346 8 518 493 0.77 
Fin_MktShare 688 38 1 927 91 0.01 
PMS_LowCost 3 692 31 977 42 0.12 
PMS_Niche 697 29 975 44 0.74 
PMS_Differentiation 709 17 978 41 0.05 
MM_Product 1 547 178 2 730 287 0.22 
MM_Price 4 697 25 7 951 61 0.05 
MM_Promotion 1 681 44 2 950 67 0.87 
MM_Place 4 616 106 5 860 154 0.94 
BS_Acquisitions 540 186 795 224 0.08 
BS_Consolidation 634 92 918 101 0.07 
BS_Diversification 700 26 984 35 0.87 
 
Future Focus 
SF_CustomerFocus 691 35 964 55 0.59 
SF_Competitors 722 4 1016 3 0.40 
SF_Innovation 670 56 1 924 94 0.38 
SF_OperateEfficiency 1 686 39 1 953 65 0.66 
SF_Collaborate 709 17 1006 13 0.09 
SF_Branding 712 14 1001 18 0.80 
Fin_Profitability 2 654 70 2 890 127 0.18 
Fin_Growth 1 528 197 2 728 289 0.81 
Fin_MktShare 709 17 998 21 0.69 
PMS_LowCost 722 4 1015 4 0.63 





PMS_Differentiation 720 6 1014 5 0.38 
MM_Product 650 76 918 101 0.70 
MM_Price 1 718 7 1015 4 0.16 
MM_Promotion 711 15 993 26 0.51 
MM_Place 1 693 32 4 967 48 0.59 
BS_Acquisitions 1 696 29 964 55 0.20 
BS_Consolidation 716 10 1007 12 0.71 
BS_Diversification 1 723 2 1 1014 4 0.89 
 




Current Focus     
Func_Management 0.045 0.061 -1.41 0.16 
Func_Finance 0.698 0.761 -1.09 0.28 
Func_Oper 0.839 0.968 -1.71 0.09 
Func_Acct 0.682 0.711 -0.34 0.73 
EXT_CustSent 0.052 0.051 0.09 0.93 
EXT_Competitors 0.033 0.013 2.5 0.01 
EXT_Collaborators 0.021 0.016 0.63 0.53 
EXT_NegContext 0.387 0.323 1.29 0.20 
EXT_PosContext 0.220 0.241 -0.68 0.50 
EXT_Economy -0.006 0.020 -1.78 0.08 
EXT_Industry -0.022 0.012 -2.51 0.01 
 
Future Focus     
Func_Management 0.000 0.003 -1.73 0.08 
Func_Finance 0.094 0.069 1.45 0.15 
Func_Oper 0.065 0.060 0.28 0.78 
Func_Acct 0.106 0.065 1.88 0.06 
EXT_CustSent 0.014 0.018 -0.59 0.56 
EXT_Competitors 0.006 0.000 1.79 0.07 
EXT_Collaborators 0.003 0.002 0.33 0.74 
EXT_NegContext 0.065 0.042 0.74 0.46 
EXT_PosContext 0.067 0.039 1.55 0.12 
EXT_Economy 0.007 -0.005 1.89 0.06 
EXT_Industry 0.010 -0.001 1.55 0.12 
 
General Focus     
Content_Words 1623.729 1507.678 1.71 0.09 
Content_Wquotes 231.349 229.862 0.13 0.89 





Content_SSentences 8.775 8.848 -0.17 0.87 
Content_Future 2.067 2.005 0.51 0.61 
Content_Past 4.152 3.793 1.48 0.14 
Content_Depth 2.879 2.685 2.93 0.00 
Content_Breadth 2.886 2.791 1.4 0.16 
GS_SourceCEO 0.873 0.874 -0.11 0.91 
GS_SourceCOO 0.028 0.017 1.49 0.14 
GS_SourceCMO 0.000 0.001 -1 0.32 
GS_SourceCFO 0.083 0.099 -1.19 0.24 







Appendix C: Event Study Results:  
This is a combined regression of all variables where the dependent variable is change in 
stock price. The first column is the coefficient and standard error for that particular 




Intercept 0.004041 (0.004225) 
SUE2 0.017534 (0.012588) 
 
Current   
SF_CustomerFocus -0.01722 (0.002845)* 0.015921 (0.014165) 
SF_Competitors -0.00135 (0.012670) -0.03943 (0.044019) 
SF_Innovation -0.00195 (0.003588) 0.056858 (0.015005)* 
SF_OperateEfficiency -0.00045 (0.002458) -0.01758 (0.011792) 
SF_Collaborate -0.00718 (0.003860) 0.052563 (0.016560)* 
SF_Branding -0.00559 (0.004275) -0.00309 (0.023175) 
Fin_Profitability 0.000999 (0.002194) 0.008553 (0.011174) 
Fin_Growth -0.00927 (0.002253)* 0.012787 (0.009979) 
Fin_MktShare 0.016234 (0.004769)* -0.06358 (0.022393)* 
PMS_LowCost -0.00529 (0.005716) 0.035630 (0.031055) 
PMS_Niche 0.010357 (0.008672) -0.00767 (0.035890) 
PMS_Differentiation 0.018296 (0.005889)* -0.01369 (0.042252) 
MM_Product 0.002185 (0.002643) 0.010819 (0.014409) 
MM_Price 0.004097 (0.004805) -0.01732 (0.025778) 
MM_Promotion 0.004561 (0.005614) 0.025135 (0.028887) 
MM_Place -0.00086 (0.003436) -0.02213 (0.015019) 
BS_Acquisitions 0.005531 (0.002989) 0.016260 (0.011681) 
BS_Consolidation -0.00749 (0.003194)* -0.01322 (0.017242) 
BS_Diversification -0.00646 (0.006299) 0.052623 (0.038118) 
Func_Management -0.00041 (0.006235) -0.01141 (0.029848) 
Func_Finance -0.00084 (0.001071) 0.013093 (0.005265)* 
Func_Oper -0.00125 (0.000844) -0.00563 (0.003009) 
Func_Acct 0.001436 (0.000699)* -0.00239 (0.004786) 
EXT_CustSent -0.00529 (0.004002) -0.04065 (0.015461)* 
EXT_Competitors -0.00708 (0.008334) 0.031148 (0.045412) 
EXT_Collaborators -0.02073 (0.007403)* 0.107467 (0.027357)* 
EXT_NegContext -0.00032 (0.001337) 0.004438 (0.006854) 
EXT_PosContext -0.00395 (0.001643)* 0.004442 (0.009143) 
EXT_Economy 0.018511 (0.003856)* 0.007394 (0.018268) 
EXT_Industry -0.00739 (0.003608)* -0.00524 (0.017660) 






Future   
SF_CustomerFocus 0.008998 (0.004392)* -0.03720 (0.020051) 
SF_Competitors 0.023751 (0.026501) 0.036706 (0.194536) 
SF_Innovation -0.01527 (0.004704)* -0.02941 (0.019349) 
SF_OperateEfficiency -0.00074 (0.005147) -0.10668 (0.023743)* 
SF_Collaborate 0.013177 (0.009665) -0.04602 (0.026992) 
SF_Branding 0.003477 (0.010808) 0.077568 (0.034025)* 
Fin_Profitability 0.006220 (0.003994) 0.005478 (0.017016) 
Fin_Growth 0.000050 (0.002535) 0.029019 (0.012774)* 
Fin_MktShare 0.008031 (0.007949) -0.00287 (0.030501) 
PMS_LowCost -0.09522 (0.020958)* 0.374651 (0.105345)* 
PMS_Niche 0.029929 (0.024914) -0.25497 (0.103835)* 
PMS_Differentiation 0.037988 (0.012089)* 0.063746 (0.079002) 
MM_Product -0.00137 (0.005092) 0.005997 (0.024565) 
MM_Price -0.01186 (0.027547) -0.16255 (0.136976) 
MM_Promotion -0.01748 (0.009874) -0.01709 (0.033022) 
MM_Place 0.006835 (0.005553) 0.000433 (0.028305) 
BS_Acquisitions -0.00086 (0.004923) 0.026473 (0.032082) 
BS_Consolidation 0.004776 (0.009022) 0.014852 (0.045950) 
BS_Diversification 0.059847 (0.051301) -0.08214 (0.089247) 
Func_Management 0.107074 (0.037211)* -0.30555 (0.315851) 
Func_Finance 0.010419 (0.004404)* -0.00225 (0.015252) 
Func_Oper 0.006490 (0.004377) -0.00971 (0.020052) 
Func_Acct 0.001188 (0.003149) 0.011988 (0.020138) 
EXT_CustSent 0.016095 (0.010172) 0.037206 (0.057441) 
EXT_Competitors 0.011984 (0.032826) -0.04725 (0.090458) 
EXT_Collaborators -0.06680 (0.039869) -0.82350 (1.174672) 
EXT_NegContext -0.00305 (0.004164) 0.115199 (0.031154)* 
EXT_PosContext 0.008401 (0.004921) -0.04424 (0.031206) 
EXT_Economy 0.008940 (0.006429) -0.08156 (0.057046) 
EXT_Industry -0.01934 (0.008630)* 0.085207 (0.042683)* 
 
General Items   
Content_Words -0.00000 (0.000001) -0.00000 (0.000008) 
Content_Wquotes 0.000001 (0.000016) -0.00014 (0.000104) 
Content_Sentences 0.000048 (0.000048) -0.00008 (0.000178) 
Content_SSentences -0.00051 (0.000380) 0.004265 (0.002740) 
Content_Future -0.00123 (0.000571)* 0.008930 (0.002857)* 
Content_Past -0.00014 (0.000280) 0.001696 (0.001460) 
Content_Depth -0.00109 (0.001353) 0.015626 (0.006892)* 
Content_Breadth 0.006432 (0.001284)* -0.02586 (0.006631)* 





GS_SourceCOO -0.00801 (0.010583) 0.069200 (0.034021)* 
GS_SourceCMO 0.197704 (0.214062) 0 () 
GS_SourceCFO 0.008510 (0.004789) -0.01027 (0.018288) 






Appendix D: Combined Regressions Split by Earnings for Essay 2 
This is a similar setup to that in Appendix C. However, now there are 2 models. The first 
(Column 1) is a model for only firms that missed earnings. Column 2 reports the 
coefficients for firms that only beat earnings. 
Parameter Missed Earnings Made Earnings 
Intercept -0.01197 (0.005850)* 0.018686 (0.006023)* 
 
Current   
SF_CustomerFocus 0.005664 (0.004774) -0.01861 (0.003625)* 
SF_Competitors -0.00069 (0.017247) -0.01973 (0.019882) 
SF_Innovation -0.01218 (0.005110)* 0.013525 (0.004035)* 
SF_OperateEfficiency -0.00116 (0.003936) 0.004751 (0.003032) 
SF_Collaborate -0.01428 (0.005308)* 0.003082 (0.005926) 
SF_Branding -0.00755 (0.009373) -0.00910 (0.005306) 
Fin_Profitability 0.002315 (0.003493) -0.00241 (0.002833) 
Fin_Growth -0.01175 (0.003455)* -0.00542 (0.003069) 
Fin_MktShare 0.012341 (0.008123) 0.005384 (0.005935) 
PMS_LowCost -0.00884 (0.009775) -0.00253 (0.007390) 
PMS_Niche 0.001172 (0.012265) 0.015193 (0.010792) 
PMS_Differentiation 0.006994 (0.013979) 0.016296 (0.006663)* 
MM_Product 0.005962 (0.004210) 0.006140 (0.003617) 
MM_Price -0.00064 (0.009387) 0.003255 (0.004731) 
MM_Promotion -0.01587 (0.011374) 0.001627 (0.006364) 
MM_Place 0.009396 (0.005742) -0.00516 (0.004355) 
BS_Acquisitions -0.00881 (0.004259)* 0.010505 (0.004169)* 
BS_Consolidation 0.010271 (0.004788)* -0.01309 (0.004618)* 
BS_Diversification 0.004159 (0.009835) -0.01656 (0.008204)* 
Func_Management -0.00614 (0.009558) 0.011115 (0.008525) 
Func_Finance 0.001814 (0.001647) 0.000886 (0.001521) 
Func_Oper 0.002766 (0.001162)* 0.001673 (0.001046) 
Func_Acct 0.000502 (0.000885) 0.003395 (0.001172)* 
EXT_CustSent 0.002951 (0.006202) -0.01540 (0.004917)* 
EXT_Competitors -0.00037 (0.011600) 0.001711 (0.011033) 
EXT_Collaborators -0.01634 (0.009893) -0.01256 (0.010111) 
EXT_NegContext 0.001048 (0.002032) -0.00047 (0.001945) 
EXT_PosContext -0.00491 (0.002506)* -0.00464 (0.002195)* 
EXT_Economy 0.019383 (0.005529)* 0.014492 (0.005094)* 
EXT_Industry 0.006934 (0.005829) -0.01592 (0.004878)* 







Future   
SF_CustomerFocus -0.00396 (0.010034) 0.002086 (0.005113) 
SF_Competitors 0.068826 (0.037673) 0.025459 (0.039888) 
SF_Innovation -0.01136 (0.007203) -0.02655 (0.005062)* 
SF_OperateEfficiency 0.035377 (0.010307)* -0.01343 (0.006121)* 
SF_Collaborate 0.068967 (0.010079)* 0.014217 (0.014166) 
SF_Branding 0.004175 (0.017454) 0.009093 (0.015001) 
Fin_Profitability -0.00548 (0.006271) 0.007178 (0.004674) 
Fin_Growth 0.001202 (0.004349) 0.005710 (0.003236) 
Fin_MktShare -0.03462 (0.012745)* 0.030546 (0.009749)* 
PMS_LowCost -0.12793 (0.031660)* 0.017507 (0.032712) 
PMS_Niche 0.076453 (0.043373) -0.06915 (0.030115)* 
PMS_Differentiation 0.041887 (0.018714)* 0.067365 (0.014655)* 
MM_Product 0.002744 (0.008894) 0.004972 (0.006503) 
MM_Price -0.00806 (0.030984) -0.07026 (0.042241) 
MM_Promotion 0.005063 (0.022088) -0.02034 (0.010481) 
MM_Place 0.004648 (0.008835) 0.002619 (0.008114) 
BS_Acquisitions -0.00627 (0.008592) 0.010608 (0.006880) 
BS_Consolidation -0.01124 (0.015303) 0.015759 (0.012712) 
BS_Diversification 0.043170 (0.178537) 0.024834 (0.027070) 
Func_Management 0.071532 (0.029476)* 
Func_Finance -0.00649 (0.006975) 0.011601 (0.005508)* 
Func_Oper 0.008128 (0.008218) 0.005858 (0.005241) 
Func_Acct 0.000735 (0.004660) -0.00142 (0.004446) 
EXT_CustSent -0.02014 (0.014686) 0.021780 (0.013342) 
EXT_Competitors -0.02075 (0.056365) 0.038013 (0.050095) 
EXT_Collaborators -0.06241 (0.037959) -0.20726 (0.146851) 
EXT_NegContext -0.00376 (0.005031) 0.010465 (0.006429) 
EXT_PosContext 0.016116 (0.006294)* 0.001885 (0.007071) 
EXT_Economy -0.03070 (0.008878)* 0.017066 (0.011215) 
EXT_Industry -0.03984 (0.012557)* -0.00140 (0.012304) 
Other_Firm   
 
General 
Content_Words -0.00000 (0.000002) 0.000001 (0.000002) 
Content_Wquotes -0.00010 (0.000035)* 0.000001 (0.000019) 
Content_Sentences 0.000062 (0.000057) -0.00007 (0.000077) 
Content_SSentences 0.002109 (0.000847)* -0.00080 (0.000459) 
Content_Future -0.00142 (0.000985) -0.00000 (0.000702) 
Content_Past -0.00121 (0.000431)* 0.000703 (0.000353)* 
Content_Depth -0.00242 (0.001808) -0.00112 (0.001893) 





GS_SourceCEO -0.01365 (0.004835)* -0.00738 (0.004982) 
GS_SourceCOO -0.03469 (0.012081)* 0.013779 (0.016523) 
GS_SourceCMO 0.199999 (0.222937) 
GS_SourceCFO -0.00310 (0.007107) 0.000369 (0.005460) 







Appendix E: Logically Limited Regression Event Study Model for 
Essay 2 
This Appendix presents a logically limited regression on miss, and then make earnings 
models. This is the same as in Model D, only items that were rationally collinear (word 
counts, source, etc) were removed. 
Variable Missed Earnings Made Earnings 
Intercept -0.0244 (0.0047)* 0.01552 (0.0047)* 
SF_CustomerFocus -0.0038 (0.0045) -0.0177 (0.0034)* 
SF_Competitors -0.0123 (0.0139) -0.0010 (0.0181) 
SF_Innovation -0.0142 (0.0042)* 0.01182 (0.0037)* 
SF_OperateEfficiency 0.01578 (0.0033)* 0.00491 (0.0027) 
SF_Collaborate -0.0108 (0.0049)* 0.00367 (0.0056) 
SF_Branding -0.0144 (0.0087) -0.0082 (0.0048) 
Fin_Profitability 0.00308 (0.0034) 0.00262 (0.0027) 
Fin_Growth -0.0141 (0.0032)* -0.0064 (0.0029)* 
Fin_MktShare 0.00852 (0.0069) 0.00944 (0.0053) 
PMS_LowCost -0.0083 (0.0080) 0.00354 (0.0067) 
PMS_Niche 0.01102 (0.0118) 0.01399 (0.0098) 
PMS_Differentiation 0.01349 (0.0114) 0.00954 (0.0052) 
MM_Product 0.00066 (0.0041) 0.01034 (0.0031)* 
MM_Price -0.0015 (0.0075) -0.0005 (0.0045) 
MM_Promotion 0.00561 (0.0079) 0.00723 (0.0057) 
MM_Place 0.00605 (0.0052) -0.001 (0.0040) 
BS_Acquisitions -0.0060 (0.0042) 0.01121 (0.0039)* 
BS_Consolidation 0.01255 (0.0049)* -0.0118 (0.0043)* 
BS_Diversification -0.0034 (0.0080) -0.0140 (0.0082) 
Func_Management -0.0132 (0.0083) 0.00343 (0.0082) 
Func_Finance 0.00208 (0.0015) 0.00341 (0.0013)* 
Func_Oper 0.00584 (0.0011)* -0.0009 (0.0008) 
Func_Acct -0.0002 (0.0008) -0.0000 (0.0006) 
EXT_CustSent 0.00548 (0.0055) -0.0155 (0.0044)* 
EXT_Competitors 0.00014 (0.0082) 0.0137 (0.0094) 
EXT_Collaborators -0.0138 (0.01) -0.0197 (0.0091)* 
EXT_NegContext -0.0012 (0.0013) -0.0011 (0.0018) 
EXT_PosContext -0.0076 (0.0021)* -0.0062 (0.0021)* 
EXT_Economy 0.01155 (0.0043)* 0.01611 (0.0046)* 
EXT_Industry 0.01563 (0.0053)* -0.0075 (0.0045) 
Content_Words -0.0000 (0.0000) -0.0000 (0.0000)* 
Content_Wquotes -0.0000 (0.0000)* -0.0000 (0.0000)* 





Content_Past -0.0025 (0.0003)* -0.0000 (0.0003) 
Content_Depth -0.0011 (0.0019) -0.0019 (0.0018) 
Content_Breadth 0.01337 (0.0017)* -0.0007 (0.0017) 
BTM 0.00211 (0.0011) 0.00262 (0.0015) 
EPS_1 0.0077 (0.0025)* 0.00000 (0.0000) 






Appendix F: Calendar Time Portfolio Results I for Essay 2 
This presents the individual daily abnormal alpha for portfolios formed by firms that 
referenced a particular statement. For each variable, there are 2 portfolios formed, 
relating to earnings exceeded or missed. The holding period is 6 months. 
Variable Made Earnings Missed Earnings 
SF_CustomerFocus 0.00335 (0.0208) -0.0209 (0.0303) 
SF_Competitors 0.03941 (0.0610) -0.0510 (0.0618) 
SF_Innovation -0.0238 (0.0304) -0.0237 (0.0315) 
SF_OperateEfficiency 0.02660 (0.0194) -0.0054 (0.0211) 
SF_Collaborate -0.0102 (0.0319) -0.0012 (0.0362) 
SF_Branding -0.0394 (0.0264) -0.0182 (0.0425) 
Fin_Profitability -0.0119 (0.0161) 0.01253 (0.0195) 
Fin_Growth 0.01929 (0.0132) 0.00209 (0.0185) 
Fin_MktShare -0.0041 (0.0258) -0.0033 (0.0437) 
PMS_LowCost 0.08297 (0.0397)* -0.1115 (0.0480)* 
PMS_Niche 0.07193 (0.0692) -0.0451 (0.0479) 
PMS_Differentiation 0.03001 (0.0476) -0.0426 (0.0493) 
MM_Product -0.0028 (0.0186) -0.0263 (0.0270) 
MM_Price 0.04143 (0.0294) 0.03028 (0.0473) 
MM_Promotion -0.0883 (0.0278)* -0.0491 (0.0371) 
MM_Place -0.0063 (0.0233) 0.00781 (0.0301) 
BS_Acquisitions 0.01235 (0.0178) 0.00919 (0.0218) 
BS_Consolidation 0.01885 (0.0229) 0.03020 (0.0308) 
BS_Diversification 0.06932 (0.0358) -0.0546 (0.0460) 
Func_Management 0.00213 (0.0441) -0.0666 (0.0469) 
Func_Finance 0.02604 (0.0150) -0.0061 (0.0198) 
Func_Oper 0.01250 (0.0155) 0.00393 (0.0183) 
Func_Acct 0.00879 (0.0164) -0.0141 (0.0243) 
EXT_CustSent 0.02569 (0.0314) -0.0292 (0.0362) 
EXT_Competitors 0.06027 (0.0492) -0.0307 (0.0509) 
EXT_Collaborators -0.0067 (0.0623) 0.00305 (0.0505) 
EXT_NegContext 0.01701 (0.0201) 0.00903 (0.0265) 
EXT_PosContext 0.03597 (0.0191) 0.04100 (0.0261) 
EXT_Economy 0.07885 (0.0267)* 0.02128 (0.0474) 







Appendix G: Calendar Time Portfolio Results II for Essay 2 
This presents the individual daily abnormal alpha for portfolios formed by firms that 
referenced a particular statement. For each variable, there is a single portfolio formed. 
Two types of methods are used. The does not have daily rebalancing of the portfolio 
while the second does. The holding period is 12 months. 
Variable no rebalancing daily rebalancing 
Current 
SF_CustomerFocus -0.034 (0.014)* -0.029 (0.015)* 
SF_Competitors -0.058 (0.040) -0.056 (0.044) 
SF_Innovation -0.036 (0.019) -0.039 (0.022) 
SF_OperateEfficiency -0.000 (0.013) 0.0003 (0.014) 
SF_Collaborate -0.031 (0.208) -0.027 (0.021)
SF_Branding -0.042 (0.022) -0.046 (0.022)*
Fin_Profitability -0.009 (0.012) -0.006 (0.012) 
Fin_Growth -0.001 (0.009) 0.0030 (0.010) 
Fin_MktShare -0.030 (0.018) -0.017 (.018) 
PMS_LowCost -0.018 (.023) -0.017 (.024) 
PMS_Niche -0.006 (.030) -0.008 (.027) 
PMS_Differentiation -0.013 (.038) -0.013 (.031) 
MM_Product -0.030 (.016) -0.027 (.017)
MM_Price 0.0220 (.020) 0.0209 (.020)
MM_Promotion -0.075 (.023)* -0.079 (.023)* 
MM_Place -0.017 (.014) -0.009 (.014) 
BS_Acquisitions -0.004 (.011) 0.0040 (.013) 
BS_Consolidation -0.008 (.017) -0.001 (.018) 
BS_Diversification -0.033 (.030) -0.021 (.028) 
Func_Management -0.055 (.030) -0.036 (.029) 
Func_Finance -0.001 (.013) -0.001 (.012)
Func_Oper -0.005 (.011) -0.002 (.013)
Func_Acct -0.017 (.012) -0.012 (.012) 
EXT_CustSent -0.012 (.024) -0.013 (.022) 
EXT_Competitors -0.042 (.033) -0.024 (.032) 
EXT_Collaborators -0.043 (.035) -0.038 (.034) 
EXT_NegContext 0.0028 (.013) 0.0115 (.013) 
EXT_PosContext 0.0155 (.014) 0.0219 (.014) 
EXT_Economy 0.0284 (.021) 0.0353 (.021)
EXT_Industry 0.0335 (.030) 0.0386 (.030)







Future   
SF_CustomerFocus 0.0080 (.030) -0.000 (.024) 
SF_Competitors 0.0190 (.066) -0.006 (.070) 
SF_Innovation -0.031 (.024) -0.031 (.024) 
SF_OperateEfficiency 0.0239 (.031) 0.0259 (.027) 
SF_Collaborate -0.060 (.035) -0.062 (.039) 
SF_Branding 0.0337 (.036) 0.0285 (.035) 
Fin_Profitability 0.0086 (.018) 0.0131 (.018) 
Fin_Growth -0.018 (.011) -0.019 (.013) 
Fin_MktShare -0.012 (.033) -0.008 (.037) 
PMS_LowCost -0.117 (.058)* -0.118 (.074) 
PMS_Niche 0.0209 (.050) 0.0151 (.057) 
PMS_Differentiation 0.0008 (.034) -0.012 (.040) 
MM_Product -0.035 (.021) -0.036 (.022) 
MM_Price 0.1037 (.058) 0.0872 (.062) 
MM_Promotion -0.009 (.030) -0.008 (.031) 
MM_Place -0.021 (.021) -0.024 (.022) 
BS_Acquisitions 0.0111 (.029) 0.0101 (.026) 
BS_Consolidation 0.0490 (.059) 0.0314 (.046) 
BS_Diversification -0.114 (.089) -0.124 (.094) 
Func_Management -0.035 (.091) -0.031 (.090) 
Func_Finance -0.001 (.025) -0.010 (.027) 
Func_Oper 0.0130 (.027) 0.0244 (.027) 
Func_Acct 0.0123 (.026) 0.0182 (.025) 
EXT_CustSent 0.0044 (.041) 0.0070 (.040) 
EXT_Competitors 0.0089 (.078) 0.0252 (.080) 
EXT_Collaborators -0.082 (.089) -0.087 (.088) 
EXT_NegContext 0.0158 (.024) 0.0280 (.025) 
EXT_PosContext 0.0330 (.028) 0.0334 (.028) 
EXT_Economy 0.0424 (.035) 0.0429 (.038) 
EXT_Industry 0.0595 (.041) 0.0521 (.040) 
   
General   
Content_Words -0.011 (.010) -0.007 (.011) 
Content_Wquotes -0.014 (.010) -0.009 (.011) 
Content_Sentences -0.012 (.010) -0.007 (.011) 
Content_SSentences -0.014 (.010) -0.009 (.011) 
Content_Future -0.012 (.010) -0.008 (.011) 
Content_Past -0.019 (.011) -0.014 (.012) 
Content_Depth -0.013 (.010) -0.008 (.011) 
Content_Breadth -0.013 (.010) -0.008 (.011) 





GS_SourceCOO -0.025 (.033) -0.011 (.032) 
GS_SourceCMO 0.0492 (.215) 0.0492 (.215) 
GS_SourceCFO -0.026 (.025) -0.024 (.021) 
GS_SourceOther -0.004 (.034) -0.005 (.033) 
 
